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Chapter 2 Cyber trust and crime 
prevention 
 
Brian S. Collins and Robin Mansell1 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Cyberspace is global in its reach. In the UK and elsewhere, many solutions 
for crime prevention could be introduced through public or private initiatives. 
Many of these solutions, however, require internationally coordinated action 
if they are to be effective. In the UK the science and engineering base is 
strong in key technical areas as well as with respect to problems and issues 
that are the concerns of the legal profession, the social sciences and the 
humanities. This provides a strong basis for leadership internationally. 
The evolution of cyberspace is a subject of great controversy. There are 
divergent views about whether the UK has a competitive advantage in 
developing technologies that will be trusted by the majority of their users and 
whether there is a need for government initiatives to ensure the development 
of trustworthy technologies. There are similarly divergent views about the 
need to constrain cyberspace developments in order to limit the potential for 
destructive attack, strengthen collective security and limit privacy invading 
intrusions. The scientific evidence base cannot be applied to resolve all of 
these controversies. However, it can be applied to clarify how the human and 
technical components of cyberspace relate to each other. Our synthesis of the 
chapters in this volume is designed to suggest how the interventions in 
cyberspace of different actors are likely to reverberate throughout the social 
and technical system. 
In the UK, Foresight projects are designed to produce challenging visions 
of the future with the aim of ensuring that the strategies of today are effective. 
The Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention project explored the application and 
implications of new generations of information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) in a variety of areas that will present opportunities and 
challenges for crime prevention in the future. These areas included identity 
and authenticity, system robustness and dependability, security and 
information assurance, and privacy and surveillance. All of these raise crucial 
issues for our understanding of how risk is perceived and trust is fostered 
within complex social and technical systems. The synthesis in this chapter 
emphasizes key interrelationships between the human and technical 
components of cyberspace.  
The material in this chapter is based on the state-of-the-art science reviews 
commissioned for the Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention project. The ten 
major reviews of current work in Parts 2 and 3 of this volume provide 
authoritative reference material and a foundation for further research and 
debate.2 Each of these chapters highlights the current state of knowledge in 
selected areas as well as research that is needed to clarify and build an 
improved knowledge base in the future. In Part 4, we include three short 
notes by experts who were invited to comment on a specific topic.3  
Section 2.2 provides a brief discussion of the technologies of cyberspace. 
In Section 2.3 we consider how those who design computer-based systems 
understand the processes involved in constructing them as well as the 
processes of, and mechanisms for, identifying and authenticating users. 
Important issues of the usability of these mechanisms, the role of cyber-
security and risk management, and the future prospects for the trustworthiness 
of cyberspace are also considered in this section.  
The construction and use of cyberspace systems requires many 
assumptions about the experience and perceptions of trust and risk, as 
cyberspace tools and applications are developed. In Section 2.4 we examine 
theories and empirical evidence from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. 
These help to shed light on trust and risk management and on the appropriate 
models for understanding trust in offline and online environments. We 
examine the ethical issues and stances that inform divergent and deeply held 
commitments to the need for a more dependable cyberspace.  
The discussion in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 is principally concerned with 
general trends that apply broadly across the components of the human and 
technical cyberspace system. In Section 2.5 we examine how various models 
of trust are being applied in two important areas of technical development – 
software agent-based systems and knowledge technologies and the semantic 
web. We also consider the available, albeit limited, empirical evidence on the 
way cyberspace users think about trust.  
In Section 2.6 we examine the economic features and likely dynamics of 
the evolution of future cyberspace technology and service markets and the 
interaction of these features with policy measures and the legislative 
environment. Finally, in Section 2.7 we reflect on the lessons that can be 
drawn from existing research about the future context in which crime 
prevention strategies will evolve. This section highlights areas where 
measures could be taken to develop more trustworthy cyberspace systems that 
  
may help to strengthen crime prevention strategies. The overriding concern is 
to minimize the potential for cyberspace to develop in ways that create new 
opportunities for physical and cyber crime to occur. 
2.2 THE TECHNOLOGIES OF CYBERSPACE 
We briefly introduce the hardware, software and human systems that 
comprise cyberspace in this section. ‘Technology’ may refer to the 
components of cyberspace, such as its hardware and software, or it may refer 
to the social values, norms, practices and institutions of cyberspace. 
‘Cyberspace’ refers to interconnected networks or the spaces within which 
electronic communications take place and this term has become synonymous 
with the Internet and the World Wide Web and their use by the public 
(Skibell 2002).4 Those who invent, design and implement the ICTs that 
underpin cyberspace, generally agree that much needs to be done to build 
confidence both in people and in the ‘mechanics’ of cyberspace. 
Analyses of the technical and possible market developments in the field of 
pervasive computing and trustworthy ICT systems show that some of the 
technologies are relatively mature and well-understood, but still evolving. 
Other technologies are immature, but reasonably predictable in their 
evolution, and still others are in the ‘blue-skies’ research phase (Sharpe 2003; 
Sharpe and Zaba 2004). The technologies range from those used for pattern 
recognition and cognitive modelling to those supporting network connectivity 
and broadband access. They include various kinds of software, service 
platforms and service functionalities.  
In this chapter, we focus particularly on the development of complex 
software systems and the technologies used to establish identity and to 
authenticate users of cyberspace. We look specifically at developments in 
software agent-based computing and knowledge technologies and the 
semantic web. All of these technologies play a crucial role in the emergence 
of ‘pervasive’ or ‘ubiquitous’ computing and the spread of networks of 
‘ambient intelligence’ (see Box 2.1). And these technologies play a major 
role in the extent to which issues of risk, trust, privacy and security and also 
ethical issues become important in crime prevention strategies. 
As suggested in Box 2.1, the majority of current users of cyberspace do 
not have a good understanding of today’s security requirements. As the 
European Commission’s Advisory Group on Information Society 
Technologies (IST) has suggested, the solutions for improving cyber trust and 
crime prevention in a pervasive computing or ambient intelligence 
environment are likely to be quite different from those in use today. 
Box 2.1 Ambient intelligence and the security paradigm 
‘In the ISTAG [Information Society Technologies Advisory Group] concept of 
Ambient Intelligence, intelligence is pervasive and unobtrusive in the 
environment. The environment is sensitive to the presence of living people in it, 
and supports their activities. People, physical entities, and their agents and services 
share this new space, which encompasses both the physical and virtual worlds – 
the Ambient Intelligent Space – or AmI Space. 
Security in this space will require solutions very different from those of today’s 
systems which are predicated on relatively stable, well-defined, consistent 
configurations, contexts, and participants to the security arrangements. … This 
new paradigm will be characterized by ‘conformable’ security, in which the degree 
and nature of security associated with any particular type of action will change 
over time and with changing circumstances and with changing available 
information so as to suit the context. … within the existing security paradigm there 
are significant outstanding problems that inhibit development of information 
society markets. The majority of potential users of services and products have, at 
best, a poor understanding of security, which leads to caution and, at worst, severe 
distrust. They need comprehensible mechanisms in which they can have 
confidence…’ (European Commission, IST Advisory Group 2002, pp. 3-4). 
The commercial setting in which ICT evolution is occurring is subject to 
the dynamics of the interactions between the players (governments, citizens 
and consumers, civil society organizations of many kinds, and businesses) 
and the choices made with respect to regulations, standards and the role of the 
market. These, in turn, are strongly influenced by changes in the motivations 
and actions of those that seek to minimize criminal opportunities through 
crime prevention and those that seek to exploit emerging technologies to 
support existing and new forms of criminal activity. In an emergent 
evolutionary system, such as cyberspace where there is an “arms-race’ 
between offenders and crime preventers, a key strategic issue is ‘how to live 
with it and how to ensure that the balance is tilted as far as possible, for as 
much of the time as possible, in favour of preventers” (Ekblom 1999, p. 47).  
Crime prevention in the context of cyberspace means reducing the risk of 
the occurrence of crime and the potential seriousness of crime and disorder 
events that may occur either in the online or offline world (Ekblom 2002, 
2003). To achieve this, it is necessary to identify the problems and their 
causes. Given the relatively recent and rapid development of cyberspace it is 
not surprising that there are very substantial uncertainties about what future 
problems will emerge and how they can be tackled. It is clear, however, that 
cyberspace entails new opportunities for crime because its reliance on 
networks and communication is such that criminal events may be distributed 
across geographical space and through time in many new ways. It enables 
new computer systems and data capture methods that may be vulnerable to 
attack and, at the same time, offer innovative means of responding to criminal 
  
activity. Just as the cyberspace system design itself is evolving and adaptive, 
giving rise to new forms of criminal opportunity, so also are the potential 
offenders’ tactics and strategies (Ekblom 1997). The solutions to the 
evolutionary arms-race involving cyberspace technologies will undoubtedly 
lead to new technical design considerations, but their feasibility, in turn, will 
depend on changing social, cultural, political and economic priorities as well 
as on a number of crucial ethical considerations. 
In a dynamic socio-technical system of this kind, the components of 
cyberspace often acquire a self-reinforcing structure. The motivations of the 
different players in society will resolve themselves in particular ways, such 
that as new ICTs are implemented, parts of the system may become quite 
stable for a period of time. The significance of this is that the future use of 
ICTs will be inextricably bound up with systems that coordinate a large 
number of technologies within agreed interfaces and standards, which 
themselves will experience periods of transient stability. These evolve from 
generation to generation, as the technology shifts and the players act in 
various ways that change their respective motivations and actions.  
The range of technologies – technical and social – that is central to the 
emergent properties of cyberspace is vast.5 In this chapter, emphasis is given 
to those areas and developments that were regarded as being the most 
important by those consulted during the Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention 
project. Many of the problems that give rise to perceptions of risk and the 
insecurity of cyberspace are not new, but crime prevention in the light of 
cyberspace developments does have some new dimensions. This is 
particularly so in areas such as the management of digital identities, the 
processes and tools used to enable reciprocity in cyberspace, and the 
properties that are required to enable humans to place trust in technology 
systems, that is, in part, the trustworthiness of such systems.  
The scope of the issues examined in this chapter is informed by an analysis 
of previous studies in closely related areas. Although trust, assurance, security 
and dependability as aspects of cyberspace developments, have been 
mentioned in previous works, crime prevention itself has not been a explicit 
focus. In addition, there are differences in the focus of studies of cyberspace-
related developments conducted in the US and in Europe as suggested by the 
following extract. 
The US studies tended to be more focused on technological and managerial 
solutions to the challenges. European studies addressed these issues but discussed 
more extensively the societal context and had more explicit visions of the desired 
societal end-state. This perhaps reflects a US focus on managing the risks 
consequent on market led developments compared to the European attempt to 
direct and shape these developments. It may also reflect an embedded US view 
that ICT developments (mainly US-led) are broadly positive, compared to a more 
sceptical European view that is more concerned about the economic, social and 
political changes they will entail (Cremonini et al. 2003, p. 8). 
The European emphasis on the economic, social and political implications 
of cyberspace technologies is reflected in the state-of-the-art science reviews 
that follow this chapter. Pervasive computing will give rise to the need for 
new paradigms for managing uncertainty, the perceived and actual risks of 
cyberspace, and the trustworthiness of the cyberspace system.  
The technical and human components of cyberspace form a complex 
emergent system that is subject to periods of instability and stability. 
Historically, studies of innovation and techno-economic change demonstrate 
periods of instability and stability as technical and human or social systems 
interact in new ways. There is no reason to expect the cyberspace system to 
be different in this respect (Freeman and Louça 2001; Perez 2002). 
Addressing questions about cyber trust and crime prevention within existing 
paradigms will not suffice to alleviate concerns about threats in this 
environment. The contributors to this volume call for a stronger cross-
disciplinary research effort that will build a better foundation for 
understanding key facets of the technical and human dimensions of 
cyberspace.6 
2.3 CONSTRUCTING AND USING CYBERSPACE 
SYSTEMS 
Technological innovations could affect many elements of the web of 
interacting and mutually dependent aspects of cyber trust and crime 
prevention. The dependability of pervasive and complex computing systems 
has a clear impact on security and on risk. User identification and 
authentication mechanisms also have an impact on security and, in addition, 
are tightly bound to tokens, passwords, encryption and the usability of these 
mechanisms by human agents. We highlight in this section recent thinking 
about the way large-scale pervasive computing systems are being developed. 
Software development practices that favour the construction of more 
dependable systems are examined together with issues of identity and 
authentication. Research in these areas emphasizes technical and human 
issues and the importance of managing risk and trust in cyberspace. 
2.3.1 Towards Trustworthy Pervasive Computer Systems 
The UK is not alone in becoming ever more dependent on large networked 
computer systems yet the dependability of such systems is by no means 
always satisfactory (Royal Academy of Engineering and British Computer 
  
Society 2004). The techniques and tools available today make it possible to 
produce complex computer systems that are adequately dependable. 
However, there is a huge ‘deployment gap’, with many organizations 
attempting to produce complex systems and, in particular, software (which is 
where the complexity of such systems mainly, and appropriately, resides) 
using technical and management methods that are far from ‘best practice’. 
Even with today’s technology we seem to be unable to adapt the methods and 
techniques available to us to deploy reliable systems. In the future, as we 
invent even more complex systems, unless there is a major and disruptive 
change in the way in which we go about deploying systems, the 
trustworthiness of the underlying infrastructure and of the applications that 
run on it will degrade (see Ch. 3 in this volume). Major or radical innovations 
in technology often require equally major or disruptive changes in practices 
of system design and implementation. 
2.3.2 Dependability Technologies 
Dependability (sometimes and not always usefully termed ‘trustworthiness’) 
is the ability to avoid computer system failures that are more frequent or more 
severe and outage durations that are longer than is acceptable. The causes of 
any such failures are termed faults. It is not feasible to escape the need to 
accept some level of failure. What is at issue is the level of failure that comes 
to be seen as being unacceptable. This is a complex mix of socio-technical 
issues that is worthy of further analysis and study. Overstressing the need for 
a high dependability level when members of society will accept or tolerate a 
lower one, especially to make a system more useable, is a very important 
driver for the design and construction of a complex computer system. It is 
clear, however, that system failures should be prevented at some level. There 
are four basic dependability technologies – fault prevention, fault removal 
and fault tolerance (whose effective combination is crucial), and fault 
forecasting. These provide the means of assessing progress towards achieving 
adequate dependability (see Ch. 3). 
A variety of fault prevention and fault removal techniques are currently in 
use, in some cases as part of a formal (mathematically-based) design method. 
However, there is a need to make such methods and their tools easier to use. 
Fault tolerance is very effectively used for hardware faults and, in some 
arenas, for software faults. Fault forecasting currently has limitations with 
regard to large systems and extremely high dependability targets. 
The problem of deliberate attacks on networked computer systems and, via 
them, on other major infrastructures, by amateur and professional hackers, 
criminals or well-resourced terrorist groups is already serious and seems 
certain to grow as systems become more pervasive. Detecting the onset of 
such attacks is insufficient to ensure system dependability. Means are also 
needed for maintaining satisfactory service despite such attacks, and for 
reliably gathering evidence of the attacks if subsequent judicial processes are 
to be successful. 
Because systems are all pervasive, they are being and increasingly will be 
used in the design and testing of new systems and in the support of the 
operation of ‘transactional’ systems that the ‘end-user’ experiences. The 
reliability or trustworthiness of these other uses is just as important to the 
‘end-user’ systems as the one he or she experiences, and particularly those 
used for testing. Those used for evidence gathering in support of judicial 
processes must be at least as provably trustworthy as the end-user system, if 
not more so. The development of complex software relies on state-of-the-art 
in the software engineering process including the way projects are managed 
and the choices of technology. 
2.3.2.1 Complex software projects and software engineering processes 
Complex software projects have certain unique properties that are derived 
from the fact that they are not governed by physical laws in the way that civil 
and mechanical engineering projects are. However, complex mechanical and 
civil engineering projects have a number of properties in common, such as the 
need to share constraints and dependencies between members of the project 
team (Collins 2004). The management processes that traditionally are applied 
to software projects involve breaking the total project activity into lines of 
activity within which there are close interdependencies. These lines of 
activity are broken down further into sets of tasks that run sequentially. The 
interdependencies between lines of activity are then also established. This 
historical approach to the development of software has not been completely 
successful and there is a need for a fundamental review of the nature of the 
problem of software engineering and its architecture to develop a more 
radical approach to new ways of managing this complex set of activities to 
achieve greater dependability (Collins 2004; and see Ch. 3). 
In the organization of software projects, teams of people pursue particular 
lines of activity that are coordinated by an overall project manager. However, 
as Brooks (1995) has pointed out in his seminal book, The Mythical Man-
Month, the balance between creative work carried out by an individual in 
pursuit of the task that has been allocated to him or her, and the sharing of 
information about the work with others dependent on this individual becomes 
an unmanageable process once the team size involved in a line of activity 
exceeds some 35 to 50 people. In this area, technology itself may be able to 
provide more sophisticated environments for developers to work in, such that 
the load placed upon them for sharing can be diminished so as to rebalance 
the time that is available to them to carry out creative work (Collins 2004).  
  
Leadership in software engineering centres on the project manager’s 
ability to maintain strong discipline and the sense of direction for the 
activities involved in the face of demands for unstructured change, movement 
of team members and reallocation of financial resources. Such leadership 
qualities arise from a mix of experience in carrying out a range of tasks within 
the general field of software engineering and an understanding of the overall 
activity in a holistic sense. Without strong, sustained and high-quality 
leadership, complex software projects are almost doomed to failure and 
possibly should never even begin. 
A complex software project will be undertaken in order to meet the 
business needs of the organization or within a contract to be delivered to an 
external customer. It is vital not only that the customer is engaged in the 
development process from its inception to its completion, but also that the 
project team has well-defined mechanisms that allow the customer to be 
involved in the project and add value during its lifetime. The way in which 
the customer engages with the project may be divisive or incoherent such that 
the quality of the product is diminished to an unacceptable extent. It is a 
common experience that project management methodologies with well-
defined processes for customer engagement are not always invested in or 
trusted by customers. 
2.3.2.2 Technical choices and software requirements 
In large-scale software projects, there are significant technical choices to be 
made about how to capture requirements in a systematic way and how to 
interpret those requirements in such a way that they can be validated against 
the users’ perceptions, and in the concepts of how the software will function 
when it is installed and operating. In addition, choices must be made as to the 
design language that is used to interpret the requirements in a form from 
which the programmer can develop code that delivers the functionality that 
the user requires. There is also a choice to be made about the programming 
language. This must be compatible with the functionality of the project, but 
also with the functionality that is either concurrently developed in other 
projects or with legacy code with which it has to interoperate, and all have to 
be compatible with the target platform of both hardware and operating system 
software, on which functionality will eventually reside. Between the 
development of the code and operation there is a further level of complexity 
connected with the testing, validation and verification of the code that has 
been delivered to show that it does indeed meet the requirements of both the 
user and the system developer (Collins 2004) (see Box 2.2).  
This level of complex interdependent processes and tools is not unique to 
software engineering. Large software projects are not unusual in having 
changes imposed upon them by external factors beyond the project control 
and frequently the basic assumptions on which the projects are based will not 
be examined. In such cases it may be necessary to stop the whole project or 
re-design to accommodate these new developments. 
Box 2.2 Validating technical choices throughout the product lifecycle 
These complex choices have been written here as if they are linear choices to be 
taken sequentially. In fact they all should be taken at the start of the project in such 
a way that an integrated environment for the whole project is defined at the outset. 
If any major changes are made to the assumptions concerning any of these factors 
such that, for instance, a different programming languages is chosen or a new 
approach to testing is selected, then at least conceptually a return to the beginning 
should be taken in order to re-verify that the assumptions that were made up to that 
time, supporting the original choices that were made, are still valid (Collins 2004). 
This example of applying a professional discipline is an essential part of a 
successful complex software project. Ideally, buyers of such projects should 
insist on these disciplines being implemented as appropriate. To achieve this, 
the use of educated and experienced people in the design and implementation 
of large software projects is an essential contribution to minimizing the risk. 
2.3.2.3 Dependability and cross-disciplinary research 
Present trends indicate that as ICTs are embedded into almost everything, 
huge networked computer systems are likely to become pervasive and richly 
interconnected and required to function essentially continuously. Even 
today’s best practice, which is not used to good effect, will not suffice for the 
development and operation of such systems. The problems of producing 
dependable large complex distributed systems to match their specifications 
within time and budget constraints, and the problems of actually achieving 
adequate operational dependability from such systems when they are 
deployed, are critical components of ongoing research programmes that will 
remain important for some time. New means of governance will be essential. 
Consideration could be given to developing auditing procedures so that large-
scale software projects could be certified as having been carried out by 
appropriately qualified employees, in line with agreed standards. 
2.3.3 Identification and Authentication in Cyberspace 
As the automation of business and the use of electronic forms of 
communication increase, individuals in society are challenged with finding 
equivalents to such basic security and crime prevention features as face-to-
face recognition and hand-written signatures. Although the technology is 
changing rapidly, when two people communicate electronically, for instance, 
by email, they have usually lost the important facility of face-to-face 
  
recognition and need some other means of identifying each other. Similarly, 
while shoppers in the high street have confidence in the authenticity of the 
identities of the major stores that they frequent, it is not so easy for Internet 
shoppers to have confidence in the authenticity of a store’s web site (see Ch. 
4 in this volume). 
2.3.3.1 Identifying people, devices and data 
Identification and authentication in cyberspace involves primary objects 
whether these are people, devices or digital data. The problems associated 
with identification and authentication in the electronic world need to be 
considered in the light of the limitations of the techniques used in the pre-
electronic age, some of which are highlighted in Box 2.3. 
Box 2.3 Authenticating primary objects 
Suppose, for instance, that you look up someone’s telephone number in a directory 
and dial it. If someone answers and claims to be that person then can you be sure 
that they are the person you wish to contact? The realistic answer is ‘yes, almost 
certainly’. However, it is worthwhile to stress the assumptions you are making. 
The first is that your contact is the only person likely to pick up the phone and 
claim to be them. This, of course, may not be true. Even if the number is correct 
there may be two people at the same address with identical names, for example, 
mother and daughter. The phone call may have been re-routed by a criminal to an 
impostor who is deliberately impersonating the person you wish to contact. The 
second assumption is that the number in the directory is accurate. This is almost 
certainly true if you are relying on a paper version of the directory that has been 
published by, for instance, the telephone company and it would certainly be 
difficult for fraudsters to change people’s entries. However, the same may not be 
true if you are relying on an electronic copy of the directory where obtaining 
assurance that the information has not been altered might be much more difficult 
(see Ch. 4). 
There are three classic ways for users to authenticate themselves to a 
system, which may be a computer, a network or another individual: (i) 
something they own; (ii) something they know; or (iii) something they are, 
that is, a personal characteristic. Use of combinations of at least two is 
common. Typically, the ‘something owned’ might be a token. If that token, 
for example, a smartcard, has some form of processing capability, then the 
something known might be a password to activate the device. The personal 
characteristic is likely to be some form of biometric, such as a fingerprint, 
which might also be used as an activation process for a smartcard. It is now 
common for a smartcard to have encryption capabilities and to contain 
cryptographic keys. The authentication process may involve sophisticated 
protocols between the card and the authenticating device (see Ch. 4).  
Before any of these techniques can be used, there must be an identification 
of the users to ensure that they have, in fact, been given the correct object or 
knowledge or that the characteristic being associated with them is, in fact, 
theirs. Most commonly used authentication techniques assume that there has 
been an initial, accurate identification and rely on that assumption. 
Authentication techniques that rely on something owned and/or something 
known cannot authenticate the individual. All that they do is equate the 
individual with either the knowledge or possession. If the original 
identification is not conducted properly then disaster looms. Even if the 
identification process is correct there is always the danger that impostors may 
either obtain the knowledge or capture the token. In cyberspace it is necessary 
to prove our identities to one another using a variety of means. 
Passwords. The password is the most common form of identification used 
today. While there are substantial problems with password-based 
authentication – and these problems mean that passwords are considered a 
weak form of authentication – it should be noted that passwords are very 
familiar and convenient and are afforded a wide-degree of acceptability by 
users. Added to this, administrative safeguards can be used to ensure that 
user-chosen passwords satisfy certain criteria to help set a minimum level of 
password acceptability. Users can also be required to change their passwords 
at regular intervals, and systems often lock-down after a specific number of 
unsuccessful login attempts (see Ch. 4). 
Box 2.4 One-time password schemes 
In a one-time password scheme, a user’s password is only valid for a short time 
frame, perhaps for 30 seconds or one minute. After this time the password 
changes. The window of opportunity for an attacker is greatly reduced since an 
intercepted password is unlikely to be of use in the future. All that is required is 
that the sequence of passwords should not be easy to predict after witnessing or 
intercepting a (potentially large) set of past passwords. 
A one-time password scheme requires a moderate level of computational 
complexity, and to provide this, the user typically is provided with a token. One of 
the largest deployments is probably the RSA SecurID, which can be provided in a 
variety of forms. The card is issued to a specific user and each card contains a 
secret, which is also held at the authenticating server. The one-time password is 
computed as a complex function of the physical time, the unknown secret stored in 
the card and, optionally, a user-supplied PIN. The password on the token display 
should then match the password anticipated by the server (see Ch. 4). 
A particular form of password is the Personal Identification Number or 
PIN. We are very familiar with this mechanism from the banking industry, but 
the PIN is little more than a short, restricted password. The PIN offers very 
little security, but is typically used in a two-factor authentication system and 
  
also is used in conjunction with the bank (or automated teller machine -ATM) 
card. Fixed passwords have many good attributes – their simplicity and cost 
of administration – but the risk, in some deployments, of password discovery, 
interception and/or replay, may be too great. The one-time password is a 
move towards a stronger means of authentication (see Box 2.4). 
The RSA SecurID7 technology can be deployed in software and it is 
supported on a variety of platforms including some mobile phones. In this 
way, the cost of card deployment is mitigated and the mobile phone can be 
used as a convenient channel for deployment. Despite the improved security 
offered by the one-time password it is still not classed as strong 
authentication. Strong authentication requires real-time interaction and the 
use of cryptographic algorithms. 
Encryption. Encryption is the basis for stronger forms of authentication. 
Instead of transferring a password (or a short-lived password) as a means of 
authentication, the authenticating server and the claimant (typically a card or 
token) perform some protocol or exchange of messages. In general terms, the 
server sends a challenge to the token and a cryptographic computation takes 
place within the card or token. The result is sent back to the server for 
verification. The cryptographic computation can be based on secret 
(symmetric) key or public (asymmetric) key techniques (see Ch. 4). 
In classical cryptography, the two participants in a cryptographic exchange 
share the same secret key. Such algorithms are referred to as secret key or 
symmetric algorithms. Public key or asymmetric cryptography allows two 
participants in a cryptographic exchange to possess different keys. Such 
systems are designed so that knowledge of one key (the public key) does not 
allow an adversary to recover the other (the private key).  
 
Table 2.1 Cryptographic algorithm classification 
 
 Confidentiality Authentication 
Secret Key (Symmetric) 
Cryptography 
Block ciphers 
Stream ciphers 
Message authentication 
Codes 
Public Key (Asymmetric) 
Cryptography 
Public key encryption Digital signatures 
 
Source: Table 4.1, Ch. 4 in this volume. 
 
Public key techniques can be used to provide what are termed digital 
signatures. Public key cryptography is not problem-free. In particular, the 
problem of ensuring the availability of authenticated, valid public keys is 
significant and has proved to be practically tractable in only a few specific 
areas of deployment. Such a supporting infrastructure is referred to as a 
Public Key Infrastructure, or PKI. Cryptographic algorithms are typically 
classified as shown in Table 2.1. 
An alternative to challenge-response protocols based on public key 
techniques (which are computationally intensive) might be to use what are 
termed public key based interactive identification protocols but these do not 
provide public key encryption or digital signatures. Chapter 4, Table 4.2 
provides a summary of the different identification (entity-authentication) 
mechanisms.  
People are not the only entity that needs to be identified for cyberspace to 
be trustworthy. Information in a number of representations (documents, 
images, sounds, videos), software processes and physical devices (computers, 
networks, mobile phones, etc.) all have to be identified if a set of trustworthy 
relationships is to be established between them. At present the main 
application area is in document authentication, which, in turn, is an important 
application of cryptographic techniques. In many situations it is the 
authenticity of information that is far more important than its confidentiality. 
The term document can be extended to cover the simple electronic 
representation of physical documents and other forms of digital information, 
such as that carried on a bank card, executable code downloaded into a 
device and virtual and dynamic documents that might contain links to 
temporary resources on the Internet, or might be generated dynamically using 
temporary data stored on some server (see Ch. 4).  
When considering the authentication of a document the complexity of the 
‘document’ can have a significant impact. When we sign a standalone 
electronic document, or some executable code, then it is (reasonably) obvious 
what we intend the signature to cover and what we intend the signature to 
mean. However, if a document were to contain links to, or be generated by, 
other temporary resources, then while the implication behind the signature 
might be obvious, its execution and continued validity can introduce some 
significant problems. 
How to extend the concept of identity into these complex areas and 
engineer reliable solutions are as yet poorly understood. 
  
Biometrics. The only authentication techniques that attempt to authenticate a 
user directly are biometrics. The term biometrics is derived from the Greek 
words bio (life) and metric (to measure). The field of biometrics is the 
measurement and statistical analysis of biological data. Biometric 
authentication methods cannot be passed on to others and losing them is 
difficult (and even if the feature is ‘lost’, it cannot be used by somebody else). 
However, the possibility of impersonation by forgery may be possible (see 
Ch. 4). 
In a biometric system a personal characteristic, such as a fingerprint, is 
used and the basic assumption of the authentication process is that a person’s 
fingerprint identifies them uniquely or, more accurately, that the probability 
of two people having identical fingerprints is so small that it can be safely 
assumed to be zero. In a typical biometric system, a user will give a number 
of copies of the chosen biometric, which are converted into bit patterns and 
stored on a template. When that user wishes to authenticate to the system he 
or she provides a copy of the chosen biometric and that copy is compared to 
the template. If the copy provided is ‘close enough’ to the template then the 
user is authenticated. A fundamental problem with applying biometrics is the 
determination of what is acceptable as ‘close enough’. The main biometric 
methods in use today are: fingerprint recognition, hand geometry reading, iris 
scan, retinal scan, face recognition, signature dynamics and voice recognition 
(see Ch. 4).  
In order to be applicable for authentication, a biometric method must fulfil 
the general requirements shown in Table 2.2. No current technology is 
available or will become available that meets all the requirements to the 
fullest extent because those who seek means of circumvention will continue 
to do so. 
 
Table 2.2 General requirements for biometric methods 
 
Requirement Description 
Universality  Each person should have the characteristic.  
Uniqueness  No two persons should have the same characteristic.  
Permanence  The characteristic should neither change nor be altered.  
Collectability  The characteristic can be measured quantitatively. 
Performance  The characteristic can be efficiently measured in terms of 
accuracy, speed, robustness, and resource requirements. 
Acceptability The characteristic should be acceptable to the public. 
Circumvention  There should be no easy way to fool the system. 
 
Source: Table 4.3, Ch. 4 in this volume. 
 
Before a biometric system can be used, the user – identified in some way – 
has to enrol, providing the system with his/her biometric reference data, 
which are stored and used to produce a template which is matched with one, 
in the case of verification, or many, in the case of identification, reference 
templates. No two biometric templates match 100 per cent and their similarity 
has to be calculated. In order to make a decision, a certain threshold is 
defined, which maximizes the acceptance rate for authorized users and 
minimizes the acceptance rate for impostors. Two types of error are defined 
to measure the performance of biometric systems (see Ch. 4). 
 
Type 1: The system fails to recognize a valid user (false rejections). 
Type 2: The system accepts an impostor (false acceptance). 
 
While there is not necessarily a precise link between the two error rates, in 
practice they are typically linked. When the false rejection rate is kept small, 
the false acceptance rate tends to rise, and vice versa.  
The application domains for biometric authentication coincide with the 
application domains of conventional authentication methods, namely, access 
control to networks, physical access control to sites, entity identification and 
time and attendance control among many others (Woodward et al. 2002). 
Some applications that have attracted attention in the media include passports 
and identity cards. Many airports now issue smart cards with biometric 
templates to allow speedy checks at immigration. In the US the biometric 
used is typically either hand geometry or a fingerprint, while at Heathrow 
Airport in the UK it is iris recognition (see Ch. 4). 
2.3.3.2 Usability of authentication mechanisms 
Cyberspace is enabling new forms of attack on people and their possessions 
and the declining cost of technology makes cyberspace attacks less risky for 
the attackers. Changes in the design of secure technologies and in social 
practices and cultural norms of information assurance influence whether 
strategies to reduce criminal acts or threats arising from unintended changes 
in information handling procedures will be effective. 
Although there are many mechanisms for authentication, there is no single 
mechanism for usable authentication. This is because the answer to the 
question ‘which is the most usable authentication mechanism?’ is that it 
depends on the characteristics of the user group, the task and the physical and 
social context in which users and security mechanisms interact (Schneier 
2000, 2003). In addition, the available mechanisms may be hard to use or 
ineffective because they make unreasonable demands on their users 
(Checkland 1999; Zurko and Simon 1996; and see Ch. 10). Box 2.5 
summarizes research on the usability of alternative means of authentication. 
  
The usability of any authentication mechanism depends crucially on the 
nature of the task to be performed. A well-designed mechanism needs to 
maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of task execution. Failure to 
provide users with the necessary understanding, training and motivation will 
result in human error. Users are often left to make a choice between 
complying with security regulations and completing a task. 
Box 2.5 The usability of authentication mechanisms 
The functioning of human memory makes strong passwords difficult to use. Users 
report that they have an increasing number of passwords to remember and 
regularly encounter problems with infrequently used passwords (Adams and Sasse 
2001; Sasse et al. 2001). In one study, 52 per cent of failed logins were due to 
users entering the wrong password.  
Research on human memory has established that human performance at 
recognition is far superior to unaided recall; images are processed and stored 
differently from words and are easier to recall. Graphical passwords authenticate 
users through recognition of images or features of images. Studies suggest that 
these perform better than passwords and other forms of infrequently used 
authentication, but informal reports from commercial trials indicate that this 
performance advantage disappears rapidly when users have multiple logins using 
the same type of image or the images/faces are changed, and they can be very slow.  
Knowledge-based authentication in the form of passwords and PINs creates 
unacceptably high costs for users and organizations in terms of stress, low task 
performance due to failed logins and reduced productivity.  
Tokens have been used for remote access by financial institutions, with apparent 
success, but the high cost of replacing lost tokens and/or lost working time has led 
companies in other sectors to abandon it. Users may need a collection of tokens, 
which they will find hard to manage, but a single token carrying multiple 
credentials raises issues for privacy protection.  
Biometrics are not secret and they can be harvested from legitimate users and 
systems, which then can be attacked. Some users are temporarily or permanently 
unable to register a particular biometric; five per cent of people are estimated not 
to have readable fingerprints and blind users cannot register iris images. 
Temporary inability to register or use a biometric can result from cuts or burns on 
fingers for fingerprints, or pregnancy or certain types of medication for iris 
recognition. Biometric authentication raises the question of acceptability among 
some user groups for religious reasons, because of safety and privacy concerns, 
and as a result of labour relations concerns about monitoring employees. Many 
banks in the UK and Germany have ruled out use of biometrics on cash dispensers 
in the foreseeable future, because of concerns about how customers will respond to 
false rejection and because the cost of the technology is too high (see Ch. 10).8 
The selection of a security mechanism and how it is configured should not 
be left to security experts because their usability depends on the context of 
business processes and workflow. Empirical studies of users of ICT systems 
suggest that many users are not motivated to comply with security regulations 
because they do not believe they are personally at risk or that they will be 
held accountable (see Ch. 10). 
2.3.3.3 Cyber-security and risk management 
Empirical research has examined the conditions under which end-users of 
cyberspace systems might begin to offer solutions to many cyberspace 
security problems (see Ch. 11 in this volume). Studies show that if a ‘culture 
of security’ can be fostered, end-users may take on responsibility for 
monitoring risks and taking appropriate action (Parker 1997; Osborne 1998; 
von Solms 2001; Wood 1995; and Ch. 11).  
The case study in Box 2.6 indicates the importance of appreciating the 
many subjective understandings of risk and the importance of communicating 
risks effectively by considering the medium as well as the message. 
Box 2.6 Security and risk communication 
A case study of an effort to launch an Internet banking product in a top-tier global 
bank – NIMETBANK -– indicates that individuals and institutions process 
messages they receive and develop their perceptions of messages according to 
previous experiences, the social and economic climate, their cultural backgrounds 
and the trust they place in messages and their sources. Trust was placed in the 
technologists who had delivered in the past. In order for us to trust a message, we 
need first to trust the communicator. Credibility of information sources is a key 
factor in risk communication such that credible sources are those that shape risk 
and security policies within organizations (Bener 2000; and see Ch. 11). 
Internal control systems are crucial to system security as demonstrated in 
the case described in Box 2.7 where issues of control in decentralized 
organizations are depicted to show the difficulties of establishing operational 
norms among different cultures and sub-cultures. 
Box 2.7 Interpreting security control rules 
The relationship between formal systems and informal organizational norms was 
investigated in an international bank with branches in London and Bangkok. A 
relatively flat matrix management system led to security guidelines being ignored 
in the local branch in Thailand partly because of the absence of a designated bank 
manager in the branch and the London manager’s failure to be responsive to the 
different cultural context in Thailand. Hofstede (1991) identifies dimensions of the 
cultural contexts that give rise to ‘social risk’. In the Bangkok branch the status of 
the formal rules was undermined by organizational changes and staff were 
resorting to personal judgments. The key lesson is that global policies and 
standardized manuals and procedures of multinational firms are not internalized in 
the same way in every branch, as had been expected by the management of this 
bank (Chauvidul 2003; and see Ch. 11). 
  
As corporate experience with the use of PKI shows (see Box 2.8), the 
technical capacity to interoperate must exist alongside the interoperability of 
institutions and their policies and practices. One instance of this is 
particularly evident in the case of standardized directories. 
Box 2.8 Security, ICT system interoperability and identity management  
Standardized directories may be used to avoid interoperability problems where 
digital certificates and a PKI are in use. A case study examined two global 
companies in the oil and finance sectors to show why it is so difficult to implement 
technical standards. The success of PKI in Oilcom was attributed to a campaign to 
knit it into the organization, but ‘islands’ of PKI began to emerge for Oilcom’s 
outward-facing trust services. At Bankrecht PKI was less successful because of the 
absence of a widely accepted institutional order, which led to the proliferation of 
PKI ‘islands’. Both companies were depending on ‘circles of trust’ in closed trade 
bodies, rather than on the PKI model’s capacity to verify identities (Wamala 2002; 
and see Ch. 11). 
In the light of growing evidence about the importance of behavioural 
factors in achieving ICT system security, there is a shift in security 
management from concern about technical devices to management issues. 
This is evidenced by the success of codes of information security 
management developed in the UK (BS7799) and by the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (IS017799). The next phase of security 
management is likely to focus on the interoperation of management policy for 
a number of business processes, such as document sharing, collaborative 
working and online dispute resolution, giving rise to the need for new 
theoretical frameworks that can be applied to address these issues. At an 
organizational level, the most immediate change to achieve a ‘culture of 
security’ is to integrate security into business processes.9 Once security aims 
appropriate to the organization are established, role models are essential to 
change behaviour and re-build the security culture to make secure behaviour a 
desirable trait that becomes embedded in professional and ethical norms (see 
Ch. 10). In addition, ratings service providers, such as Standard and Poor’s, 
and Moody’s, are likely to begin offering operational risk ratings for 
cyberspace services in the future (see Ch. 11). 
2.3.3.4 Future prospects for trustworthy cyberspace 
Weaknesses in currently used methods of ICT system development and in 
identification and authentication mechanisms allow exploitation by criminals. 
Most solutions are appropriate for certain environments and inappropriate for 
others. There is progress in securing different aspects of the cyberspace 
infrastructure, but the issues are complex and, as yet, not well formulated. 
Persuasive design techniques offer a means for designing systems that 
intrigue and, thereby, persuade and reward users for good security behaviour 
(Fogg 2003). Developing usable security mechanisms is not simply an issue 
of ‘fixing’ user interfaces to current mechanisms. Appropriate and effective 
security must be an integral part of the socio-technical system it is supposed 
to protect. Effective security must take into account the needs and potential 
conflicts of all stakeholders (see Ch. 10). 
Security needs to be integrated into ICT development approaches. It 
should be part of the software engineering documentation that developers 
work with. Technical design decisions must consider the mental and physical 
workloads imposed on system administrators as well as end users. Despite the 
fact that different authentication methods are frequently adequate for their 
purpose, they display obvious security limitations. Tokens can be lost or 
stolen and passwords and PINs can be guessed or copied. The use of 
biometrics can, at least in theory, remove some of these insecurities. We have 
reached the situation where some biometric authentication techniques have 
become quite advanced, but it is not clear that there is yet any reliable 
consistency in biometric products (see Chs 4 and 10).  
System integration is essential even in the case of the use of biometrics 
because the transmission of biometric data between different system 
components is one of the main weaknesses of a biometric system. Biometric 
data are transmitted from the sensor to the feature extractor and then to the 
matching module and onto the application. There is also a need for 
alternatives for users who inadvertently fail or are unable to use a given 
biometric test. The best solution might be to have the reference data 
(templates) stored on a smartcard or another device that the user can carry.  
Matsumoto used sweets called ‘gummy fingers’ to create forged 
fingerprints and this highlighted the future importance of liveness detection, 
that is, the biometric template used at both user registration and 
authentication should be from a live user (Matsumoto 2002). In the future, 
secondary levels of authenticity and trustworthiness will become very 
important as will methods of controlling information and metadata (see Ch. 
4). As compared to issues of primary object identification and authentication 
discussed above, issues of secondary authenticity are more subtle and 
complex. 
Secondary authenticity and trustworthiness. When we authenticate or identify 
a human or a computational device we often make the assumption that the 
supporting infrastructure will be trustworthy and that it will behave as 
intended. Without this assumption it is difficult to imagine that any solutions 
will be viable and there is a tendency to acknowledge and then ignore this 
issue (see Ch. 4). All the security mechanisms discussed above could be 
compromised simply by a failure in the administration procedure. Many 
  
security problems occur when the human being directly interfaces with the 
digital world. This happens at user registration and when a user is prompted 
for action by some application. It requires a leap of faith to assume that the 
whole system will work as intended. As more rights are managed and 
conferred by digital means – for instance with the use of digital identification 
cards as a way of providing access to services – the stakes are raised and the 
illicit gains of fraudulent behaviour are likely to increase. Box 2.9 highlights 
a few of the issues in this area. 
All these developments raise issues for the control of information and 
metadata in cyberspace. 
Box 2.9 Safeguarding the trustworthiness of infrastructure 
Consumer devices – Personal computers, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), and 
mobile phones can import code that changes their functionality. To help decide 
between good and potentially malicious code, initiatives such as code-signing are 
developing that allow a device to digitally verify the authenticity of a particular 
application.  
Smartcard manufacturers spend millions on the best ways to provide additional 
security features on the cards they produce. The integrity of a smartcard based 
solution is dependent on the fact that the smartcard offers a secure storage and 
computation environment. 
Secure computing initiatives such as Palladium and Trusted Computing Platform 
Alliance (TCPA) provide a secure and trusted computing environment.  
Good engineering and secure coding practices are being promoted, but it is unclear 
whether good security implementation practices are being used within 
deployments (see Ch. 4). 
Controlling information and metadata. Controlling information is fast 
becoming the issue of our times. Pervasive computing and ad hoc networking 
are giving rise to the need to authenticate dynamic documents that either 
point to transitory information or use transitory information in their 
construction (see Ch. 4). Metadata are information that has attached to it 
additional information serving as a description of its use and functionality. An 
extension of this concern occupies the minds of executives at companies 
providing entertainment content, for example, music and videos. The use and 
potential misuse of this information drives the whole area of Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) and leads us full circle to the issue of registration of 
identity or ownership. One DRM solution that is much discussed is 
effectively to ‘register’ the devices on which information can be accessed. 
Unlike the case of human registration where there is no digital interface, 
registering a device is technically straightforward (despite the formidable 
privacy and consumer-acceptance issues involved). 
In the future, the concept of ICT system trustworthiness will need to be 
broadened to include reliability. Catastrophic system failures are usually 
fairly easy to detect and, more often than not, to fix. Intermittent problems 
that lead to degradation rather than to outright service failure are harder to 
address. For this reason it will be very important to address the continued 
robustness or dependability of the supporting cyberspace infrastructure. As 
agent software is used for workflow, middleware and automatic negotiation, 
the importance of identification and authentication of software and data 
objects, as well as people, will grow. 
Original identification is also likely to become an issue in the future. 
Consideration will need to be given to people’s attitudes to intrusive 
measures such as taking DNA samples at birth or inserting chips. The likely 
physical consequences of implanting chips in a person’s body for life and the 
durability of the chip will need to be examined. The general problem of 
identifying ‘the original’ is a difficult one that is frequently overlooked (see 
Ch. 4).  
The problems associated with establishing identity are often ignored in 
discussions relating to the issuance of passports, digital certificates and all the 
authentication techniques that rely on biometrics. Most of the current methods 
of establishing identity seem to depend on the fact that a person’s identity has 
already been established somewhere else. Each new process is merely 
endorsing the old one. There are numerous examples of where the ability to 
impersonate someone at some point in the registration stage implies the 
ability to steal that person’s identity and impersonate the person for life (see 
Ch. 4). 
ICT forensics in the future. ICT Forensics as a branch of Forensic Science is 
  
in its infancy. The practice is mainly involved with data held on hard disks in 
PCs, PDAs and other flash memory devices. These are used by criminals for 
some activities and when captured, the data on the devices provides evidence 
of malfeasance. In order to provide such evidence, all entities – documents, 
computers and disks – concerned with the case have to be identified and 
authenticated. People are identified using traditional techniques and their use 
of systems is authenticated via system logs. 
The strength of the process of authentication of all entities that are 
considered valuable for detecting, investigating and prosecuting crime is 
critical in the case of digital evidence. If a digital image is produced as 
evidence it needs to be protected from alteration. Furthermore, if the digital 
image is obtained using a digital camera then it is necessary to verify whether 
it is the original. If the protection, such as a digital signature, is constructed 
and attached inside the camera then we need assurances about the tamper-
resistance of the camera. If it is applied using another device then we need 
procedures to ensure that it was not changed before the protection was 
applied (see Ch. 4).  
The general problem of identifying ‘the original’ for authentication 
purposes is difficult and frequently overlooked. This topic has a direct 
bearing on the trustworthiness of cyberspace and our ability to successfully 
prosecute where digital evidence is used. Similarly, if a document, that is, an 
email, a transcription of a phone call or an internal memo, is seen to provide 
evidence of a criminal activity, then some ‘proof’ that a certain person 
authored the original and when and on what ‘machine’ they did it, is essential 
if the document is to stand up in court. The quality of the proof will rely on 
not only the raw data and metadata, but also on the veracity and traceability 
of the process by which these data and metadata are managed between the 
times they are obtained by the law enforcement agency and by the court.10 
For the future, however, a number of developments are seen as being either 
disruptive to current processes or scaling up the problem to such an extent 
that new ways of dealing with computer forensic investigations will be 
essential. 
Key issues are likely to include: 
 
Scale of systems: the volumes needing to be searched in order to find data 
that might be of interest to a law enforcement agency are growing 
exponentially. Obtaining specific information to reduce this volume will 
become more and more problematic as distributed storage, possibly 
incorporated in a grid architecture, becomes the norm.11 However, legitimate 
users will face the same problem. Tools that deal with such scale will be 
developed, but they may not have the processes of auditability and 
traceability incorporated in them that will be necessary for evidence gathering 
unless this is laid down as a requirement at the outset. 
 
Distribution of data: data will, all other things being equal, be stored 
wherever it is most efficient to store them; this may not be in the jurisdiction 
of the law enforcement agency that needs to investigate an alleged crime or 
gather evidence about one that has certainly occurred. Unless some form of 
international code of practice relating to access to such data, perhaps under 
the umbrella of newly agreed digital principles, is agreed, it will become 
increasingly difficult for law enforcement agencies to access data to detect 
crimes and prosecute criminals (see also Ch. 15 in this volume). 
 
Lack of strong binding between data and suspect: as the world of 
electronic commerce and other electronic services spreads geographically and 
becomes much more pervasive, ensuring the ability to connect the record of 
any action with an information object such as a document, video or audio 
record will become more and more complex and potentially expensive. In 
order to prove in court that there is a connection between an information 
object and a person, both must be identified and a link between them 
established with appropriate spatial and temporal proofs. The strength of the 
evidence of this link, usually referred to as the strength of the binding 
mechanism, will become critical in establishing the proof that will be needed 
in court. A more relaxed objective could be to establish sufficient strength to 
allow other physical investigations to be instigated under warrant to gather 
stronger evidence. In both cases, collaboration between system designers and 
legal and law enforcement specialists would greatly increase the probability 
that this issue does not become a major obstacle to crime detection. 
 
Mass storage devices: the availability of mobile and transportable 
miniature mass storage devices will expand enormously over the next decade. 
The current use of devices, such as i-Pods for music storage, will expand to 
encompass video and data. From a crime prevention viewpoint these devices 
have a number of undesirable properties; they store huge volumes of data, 
which can be protected at the document and device level using strong 
encryption-based authentication, are only connected to a system when 
plugged in or connected via a wireless network, and can be very easily 
concealed and, in extremis, destroyed. Reliance on the analysis of log files to 
identify when and where specific devices have accessed or are accessing 
systems and networks and being able to very rapidly and accurately trace 
subsequent use seems the only opening at present for tracing illegal activities 
being perpetrated through the use of such devices. This is an extension of 
what is now possible for mobile telephony, but on a much greater scale, with 
concomitant expense; the question of whether the public or private sector 
  
wishes to bear the costs of very expensive tracking or endure rapidly 
spreading unprosecutable crime could be urgent subjects for debate. 
 
High quality encryption: high quality encryption has been freely available 
for decades. Little visible use is being made of it as yet by criminals, but most 
experts in the field consider it is only a matter of time until this happens. If 
and when it does, another layer of complexity in detection and prosecution 
will emerge, especially if there is widespread use of encryption for privacy or 
commercial-value protection. This will cause there to be a greater volume of 
encrypted material within which the criminal can conceal his or her activities. 
One mitigating circumstance is that if data can be shown to be encrypted and 
not legitimate, they could be used to make a case for further investigations 
under warrant. This would also have to be widely in line with new principles 
and practices (see Ch. 15). 
 
Gap between user system developments and forensic tools: forensic tools 
are developed by a very small number of academic groups and companies to 
meet the specific needs of current case work. User system development 
attracts billions in development investment to provide highly sophisticated 
user functionality in products such as SAP, MS Office, Oracle and bespoke 
systems for banks, trading floors, on-line news services and air traffic control. 
It is inevitable that without some collaboration with such developments, the 
ability of investigators and computer forensic experts to maintain parity with 
the environment within which the data under investigation are used and 
stored, will be limited. Such collaboration, until very recently, has been 
sporadic. Unless the ability to carry out forensic investigations is seen as 
being a legitimate requirement of a system or application design, this situation 
is likely to get worse, and the ability to prosecute e-crime using computer 
forensics could become largely non-existent.  
 
Inertia in legal systems: the rate of change in society associated with the 
spread of the Internet is probably unprecedented in recent centuries. Legal 
institutions and procedures are perceived by some to have changed very little 
as a result of the growing use of online services. This may be unfair criticism, 
but the gap between fact and perception is an important social phenomenon. 
The creation of a forum in which dialogue could occur to clarify this situation 
would be highly beneficial to all concerned. However, for such a forum to be 
trusted, the fundamental issue is how various stakeholders might react to legal 
initiatives and ethical discussions and, hence, which type of organization 
(government, judiciary, parliament, society, commerce, learned society) 
should initiate it (See Ch. 15). 
 
The nature of computer forensics: computer forensics, at present, is largely 
an activity in support of evidence-gathering by law enforcement agencies. A 
certain amount of support is given to investigative work, but very little to 
preventative investigations. Why this is so is unclear. Candidate reasons are 
too few experts, rapidly changing systems, lack of access to suitable 
environments or indecision of owners of systems as to whether they ‘want to 
know’ in advance of any potential weaknesses. The negative reaction to the 
Y2K preventative investment after the perceived ‘non-event’ is indicative that 
this last may be the dominant reason. However, it is clear that considerable 
improvements were made in terms of system resilience as a result of the 
preventative work carried out in relation to Y2K. Hence, consideration could 
be given to the balance that could be struck between evidential – investigative 
– preventative computer forensics and the risks and benefits of the options. 
 
Current research: research centres around applied activities that are 
derived from ongoing case work. Tools and techniques are being developed 
in an attempt to place the law enforcement agency and the investigator in a 
good position to ‘do better next time’. There would appear to be little 
fundamental work being carried out, especially relating to the difficult 
problems outlined above with respect to scale, complexity, criminal strategy, 
legal and constitutional issues, and the impact of new technologies. 
2.3.4 Lessons for Cyberspace Dependability and Security 
A survey carried out by UK Department of Trade and Industry and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in April 200412 indicated a rapidly growing 
dependency in British industry and commerce on critical information held in 
computer systems and an increase in the use of the Internet and the web in 
business in general. These factors combined to show an increase in security 
incidents of all types even though there was heightened awareness of the need 
for good security. This survey indicated the need for improvements across the 
board if business were to maintain or improve the dependability of services 
derived from the use of such systems. 
Dependable pervasive systems will be constructed out of multiple existing 
systems and will also need to be highly adaptable. Most will embody human 
beings as system ‘components’. The successful design and deployment of 
such systems is a major challenge that calls for expertise and socio-technical 
as well as technical dependability. Cross-disciplinary approaches to research 
and operation are essential if any inroads are to be made in this field. 
Once designed and implemented, pervasive computing systems must 
incorporate means of identifying users and of authenticating that users are 
who they claim to be for many purposes and applications in cyberspace. This 
  
is giving rise to the need for both human and technical measures to secure 
cyberspace that are responsive to the needs and behaviour of the users. We 
have examined a number of identification and authentication techniques. If 
they are to be trusted then the process of original identification must be 
adequate. Technical research into the security of technology is needed 
together with research on the effectiveness of the identification processes 
used for important everyday processes such as passport applications, bank 
account/credit card applications, including their costs and failure rates (see 
Ch. 4). 
Encryption is, at present, the only ‘strong’ mechanism available and it is 
now in reasonably widespread use. However, there are situations where it can 
be subverted or used as a tool for denial of service. An outstanding question 
is how much ‘security’ or ‘strength’ is appropriate? Procedural approaches 
and architectural solutions (separation of duties) can be used to reduce 
significantly the risk of vulnerabilities arising as a result of human behaviour 
in what might otherwise be ‘trustworthy’ processes. 
Education programmes could be used to highlight the need for compliance 
with local security policies by drawing attention to the relationships between 
offenders, targets and guardianship using a systematic framework linking risk, 
information system security, audit, compliance and human relationships. This 
would avoid the tendency for security systems to be developed in isolated 
‘silos’ within organizations.  
It is clear that developments in pervasive computing involve important 
organizational and human behavioural issues. The foregoing discussion 
clearly indicates the need to examine assumptions about the work 
organization of software engineering teams and collaborations between 
developers, and between developers and end-users. In addition, solutions for 
user identification and authentication depend on their usability and their 
security, neither of which can be addressed through technical means alone. 
2.4 EXPERIENCING TRUST AND RISK IN CYBERSPACE 
Many assumptions about trust and risk in cyberspace are made by cyberspace 
technology developers and users. These assumptions are examined next to 
suggest why there are divergent views about person-to-person, person-to-
system and system-to-system trust in cyberspace and to suggest some 
implications for crime prevention. 
The trustworthiness of the ‘space’ implemented by the use of pervasive 
ICTs will only be enhanced when we have a deeper understanding of how 
knowledge, the currency of the knowledge society and the economy, can be 
managed throughout its life cycle, both by people and agents, and 
interactively and collaboratively, in such a way that outcomes of transactions 
and interactions are predictable, at least generically, and are perceived as 
being reasonably safe. To achieve this, it will be necessary for the barriers to 
criminal or socially unacceptable use of ICTs to be sufficiently high to 
minimize opportunities for unpredictable interactions associated with 
behaviours that are not socially valued. The way system components interact 
dynamically to add value to society and the way critical technologies support 
social processes that may lead to cyberspace crime prevention, both need to 
be understood from a variety of perspectives.  
We can draw upon research focusing on risk perception and on trust and 
the nature of trustworthy systems to understand the relationships between risk 
appraisal, the likelihood of forging trusted relationships in cyberspace and the 
development of norms and practices that are consistent with crime prevention. 
The extent to which people are likely to accept government intervention or 
controls over their behaviour in cyberspace depends upon whether they are 
informed about the potential risks of cyberspace and whether they perceive 
themselves to be at risk. It is unclear whether the technical possibility of risk 
in cyberspace is the same as the reality of the perception and experience of 
risk. We are in the early stages of creating an evidence base to assess whether 
people act according to their perceptions of risk or their experience of actual 
incidents in cyberspace. These factors influence people’s willingness to place 
their trust in cyberspace. As in other areas of technological innovation, 
cyberspace is being developed in an environment that Beck (1992) and 
Giddens (1991) have called the ‘risk society’. 
2.4.1 Public Perceptions of Risk – Appraising Uncertainty 
Research on public perceptions of risk suggests that the social meaning of a 
risk influences its salience and how uncertainty is judged. Concerns about risk 
express underlying values and attitudes to blame, morality and the value 
placed on the outcome of an event. Public opinion is often contrasted with 
expert assessments of risk and this is particularly so in the case of crime that 
is facilitated by cyberspace (Liberatore 2000; Ravetz 1987; and see Ch. 8 in 
this volume). Disputes about differing conceptions of risk cannot be settled 
by stipulating definitions for disputed terms because they are systematically 
linked to ‘probabilistic’ and ‘contextualist’ dimensions of risk (see Box 2.10). 
Box 2.10 Probabilistic and contextualist dimensions of risk 
The probabilistic view of risk suggests that it is purely a matter of the probability 
of an event or its consequences. From a contextualist perspective, risk has no 
single determining criterion. A risk will always be associated with a number of 
characteristics. Probability, in this view, is simply one among other risk attributes. 
  
From the strong contextualist perspective, probability estimation may be irrelevant 
to determining the existence of a risk or for communicating it to others (see Ch. 8). 
The way the public sees experts and regulators may influence how risks, 
such as those perceived or actually experienced, are interpreted. The relative 
failure of risk communication strategies in relation to technological risks, has 
given rise to substantial research on the role of trust in risk perception (see 
Ch. 8). Public anxieties in the UK about GM food, BSE, rail safety, mobile 
phone transmitter masts and a host of other issues may be explained by a lack 
of trust or confidence in those responsible and a loss of legitimacy of certain 
public institutions.13 However, as O’Neill (2002: 12) suggests, it is important 
to distinguish between perceptions of trust as reported by participants in 
empirical studies or in the media and the “practical demands of placing trust”. 
She argues that the relation between perceptions of trust and trustworthiness 
and placing trust in public institutions, scientific evidence or professional 
judgement is not straightforward. 
The connection is that those who see their world as a “risk society” often find 
placing trust problematic: but it does not follow that they do not place trust, or 
even that they place no trust in those whom they claim to think untrustworthy 
(O’Neill 2002, p. 12). 
This perspective is important when we consider some of the insights from 
empirical studies in the field of trust and risk perception that are highlighted 
in Box 2.11. 
Box 2.11 Empirical studies of trust in risk perception 
Empirical research on the role of trust in risk perception includes work by 
Freudenburg (1993) on the effect of trust on the concerns of local citizens and by 
Slovic (1993) on the asymmetrical effects of trust building and trust destroying 
information. Slovic showed that the effect of negative information on trust 
‘destruction’ is much greater than positive information on ‘trust building’. Trust is 
related to beliefs and expectations that some possibly remote institution or actor 
will act in a particular way in a particular context (Barber 1983; Luhmann 1979). 
A lack of trust, which leads people to see risks as greater, may be based on 
expectations about risk managers’ competencies. Rather than deducing 
trustworthiness from direct evidence, people infer it from ‘value-bearing 
narratives’ using information shortcuts and images (Earle and Cvetkovitch 1995; 
Siegrist et al. 2000). Trust may be higher when the narratives or stories told by 
institutions express salient values that are similar to their own (see Ch. 8). 
Douglas (1966, 1992) argues that beliefs about purity, danger and taboo 
are essentially arbitrary. Once they become fixed, they serve to organize and 
reinforce social relations according to hierarchies of power. An individual’s 
beliefs about what constitutes an important risk are also indicative of his or 
her place in society (Rayner 1992). This observation shifts the emphasis away 
from individual differences or biases in perception of objective risks towards 
the role of inter-group distinctions. People’s conceptions of what constitutes 
danger or a risk may vary according to the way their social relations are 
organized. People may identify risks as being important or trivial because this 
reinforces established social relations within their culture, although they may 
revise their thinking over time (see Ch. 8).  
Insights into the perception of risk and trust can be drawn from theories in 
cognitive psychology, psychometric research, and studies of the relationship 
between emotion and risk perception (see Box 2.12). These insights need to 
be examined in the light of people’s perceptions about the riskiness of 
cyberspace. Their perceptions are likely to be influenced by the signs, 
symbols and representations they encounter within their social networks and 
through the media’s reporting of cyberspace events. Social meaning must be 
expected to influence appraisals of a perceived threat or an uncertain event in 
cyberspace and it places risk objects within a cultural context. 
Box 2.12 Contributions from psychology 
Cognitive Psychology 
Risk perception can be seen as a matter of judgement about an uncertain event – its 
likelihood and its consequences. People do not follow the principles of probability 
theory when judging the likelihood of uncertain events. They employ ‘rules of 
thumb’ and theory suggests these include the representativeness of an event and 
the ease of recalling a similar class of events. The greater the ease of recall, the 
more numerous such events are likely to seem.  
The Psychometric Paradigm and Risk 
The psychometric approach to the study of risk perception has helped ‘to 
demonstrate that the public’s viewpoint must be considered not as error but as an 
essential datum’ (Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents 1992, p. 91). This 
approach aims to elicit judgements about risks from individuals who are 
confronted by hazard stimuli in order to understand quantitative judgements about 
risks and the subjective dimensions. Personal risk taking activities are seen as less 
risky and more acceptable.  
Emotion and Risk Perception 
A distinction is drawn between two modes of information processing: formal, 
logical and numeric reasoning and ‘intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal, 
narrative and experiential’ reasoning. This approach highlights the interplay 
between emotion and cognition. A stimulus can evoke images that become tagged 
with affect, such that the overall affective impression can be more influential than 
more cognitive assessments. This may increase judgements of riskiness and 
decrease the perceived level of benefit (see Ch. 8). 
Murdock et al. (2003) suggest that the media can amplify or attenuate 
perceptions of risk if they resonate with public feelings and mood and if the 
  
symbols and representations capture existing public concerns and frames of 
reference. Petts et al. (2001) show how patterns of talk and the structures of 
accounts of events influence lay interpretations of risk. ‘Risk signatures’ can 
become grounded in everyday experience and the more they are grounded, 
the more they are seen as personal and credible threats (Horlick-Jones et al. 
2003). 
Empirical accounts of the narrative structure of risk communication 
demonstrate that whereas experts see risks as chains of cause and event, lay 
people tend to see them in a social context of relationships (Wiedemann et al. 
2003; and see Ch. 8). Research is needed to assess the importance of these 
insights in the context of cyberspace. 
2.4.2 Trusting in Cyberspace 
Trust is a means of alleviating risks, but there is only a weak empirical 
foundation for assessing the basis upon which people are prepared to trust 
others in cyberspace or to trust in the trustworthiness of ICT systems. It is 
clear, however, that growing numbers of interactions are occurring between 
strangers who have never met ‘in real life’ and exchanges of a social and 
commercial nature are clearly increasing, indicating that whatever the 
explanation of the basis for trust, people do act as if they trust ‘virtual’ others 
in many instances. 
For example, in the commercial world, people are buying and selling 
goods from each other on eBay, spending hours playing computer games and 
dating via instant messaging. Massively Multiplayer Online Games 
(MMOGs) involve increasing numbers of people in buying and selling 
imaginary ‘property’ and avatars. Game players have invented a currency for 
exchange, the total value of which in 2001 was estimated as equivalent to the 
GDP of a relatively wealthy country (Tyrrell 2004). More and more 
government services are being provided online, giving rise to new means of 
accessing information and of communicating between all the actors in the 
social system.  
These relationships are possible only to the extent that people behave as if 
they trust in each other and in the systems they use. Issues of trust involve 
person-to-person, person-to-system and system-to-system trust. The former 
two are emphasized in this section (the latter was addressed in Section 2.3 
above). Box 2.13 highlights questions that are often asked about trusting in 
cyberspace from the end-user’s point of view. 
Box 2.13 Trusting in cyberspace 
Trusted connections between machines: is your computer connecting to the one 
you have asked it to? Is the connection secure? Is your security being 
compromised by the other system? 
Trusted, verifiable content: are you sure that the content you are downloading is 
real rather than pirated? If you are downloading from a specific site, can you verify 
that the site is the one you think it is? 
Trusted transactions: are you confident that any transactions and credit card (or 
other private) details are secure? Or, at least, are you aware of the level of security 
that exists?14  
2.4.2.1 Cyberspace trust and expectations 
Trust is a critical factor for the acceptance of electronic services including 
those provided by electronic commerce and e-government service providers. 
Research in the fields of human-computer interaction (HCI) and computer 
mediated communication (CMC) focuses on increasing people’s trust 
perceptions, rather than on enabling people to make reasonable decisions 
about what or whom they may trust in cyberspace (see Ch. 10 in this volume). 
The need for a trust framework for understanding online commercial 
interactions has been recognized in this literature to differentiate between 
situations requiring different types and levels of trust.15 In the case of 
electronic commerce, the trustor may have to wait for days or weeks to take 
possession of goods and check that they are satisfactory. Interactions in 
cyberspace may be perceived as being riskier and demanding greater trust 
than similar interactions in a physical context. Whether people are prepared 
to engage in a relationship has been found empirically to depend on many 
factors including the following: 
 
• The number of actors involved in the exchange (ranging from a single 
pair to potentially millions in public-good dilemmas). 
• The actor type (individuals, organizations, technology). 
• Whether there is synchronous or asynchronous trust exchange 
(strategic insecurity). 
• Whether the user can identify trust-warranting properties.  
• The types of signals employed to communicate trustworthiness 
(symbols and symptoms of trustworthiness, identity- and property-
signals). 
• The person potentially placing trust, including propensity to trust, 
knowledge of the situation, prior experience, potential benefits they 
expect, and the risk they face (enacted as ‘trusting action’) 
(Riegelsberger et al. 2003; and see Ch. 10). 
 
Trust needs to be a core concern in the design and deployment of 
cyberspace technologies and it is now being acknowledged more widely that 
technical systems can only work as part of a larger socio-technical system 
  
(Checkland 1999). Trust appears to reduce the need for costly control 
structures, and makes social systems more adaptable (Uslaner 2002). 
Information exchanges that are now being mediated by technology or even 
executed with technology as a transaction partner, put more responsibility for 
supporting trust on the designers and operators of the technical systems 
(Reigelsberger et al. 2003). 
2.4.2.1 Game theoretic and institutional approaches to trust 
From the vantage point of game theoretic models, trust can be conceived as 
arising out of expectations. This body of theory indirectly informs much of 
the thinking about the future role of software agent-based computing in 
cyberspace. We examine theoretical arguments about trust developed in the 
economics discipline next. 
Trust is a matter of expectation – a trusting individual has some opinion 
about what might happen, some notion as to how likely the various 
possibilities are and some belief about how these outcomes and their 
likelihood are affected by his or her choices. Various models of choice that 
take account of the probabilistic nature of risk may be used to represent these 
assessments. Trust may also involve more or less consequentialism, that is, it 
may be bound up with the process as well as the outcomes. For example, an 
online customer may trust a transaction without distinguishing between the 
(distinguishable) reliability of the merchant, the payment and/or delivery 
services, and the legal mechanisms that provide compensation in the event of 
loss. Trust has been a difficult concept for economists to clarify (Hollis 
1998), but its influence is widely acknowledged (see Chs 12 and 13 in this 
volume). Considerable research focuses on the development of game 
theoretic approaches (see Box 2.14). 
Box 2.14 Games and incomplete information 
Decisions to interact with other individuals for gain or loss, for example, buying 
and selling, employment, cooperation for purposes of mutual gain, etc., are 
conceived by economists as ‘games’. A decision to ‘play’ in a game, if alternatives 
are available, in essence, involves trust: one trusts that the interaction is as 
described, that the other player(s) (actor(s)) will behave as expected. This trust is 
essentially an expectation – an assessment of what will happen in the future and in 
different contingencies. When individuals regard other actors as being 
unresponsive or unpredictably responsive to their choices, the economic analysis 
of incomplete information is used to analyze the interaction. When individuals see 
their choices as being interdependent, the appropriate economic approach is game 
theoretic (see Chs 12 and 13). 
A basic framework for distinguishing game theoretic from information and 
institutional economics frameworks is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Game 
theoretic analysis applies when the institutional framework, including laws, 
rules, norms and standards, is incomplete because strategic actions will affect 
the institutional framework. Such analysis is not relevant where interactions 
cannot be affected by others’ actions. 
An alternative approach that de-emphasizes the role of game theoretic 
analysis focuses on the institutional structures – laws, rules, norms, and 
standards – that are imposed on market players and govern their interactions 
(Williamson 1975, 2000). The fields of transaction cost economics and ‘new’ 
institutional economics both acknowledge that long-term contracts are often 
incomplete. When parties are mutually dependent on the maintenance of 
business ties there is a strong incentive not to defect or behave 
opportunistically. This incentive amounts to what some would call ‘trust’. 
Economists focus on the costs of breaching trust as the principal motive for 
maintaining it (see Chs 12 and 13). Trust serves as a ‘lubricant’ in markets, 
reducing transaction costs and assuring something closer to perfect 
competition. The institutional framework for cyberspace transactions involves 
the use of technical methods for user authentication, time-stamping and 
electronic signatures; and norms or standards, such as indemnification from 
fraud. These can reduce the costs of transactions and make them more likely 
to occur. 
 
Figure 2.1 The domain of game theoretic analysis 
 
 
Source: See Figure 13.1, Ch. 13 in this volume. 
 
Economists also draw a distinction between trusting – whether I should 
  
trust another entity (person, group, institution, etc.) and trustworthiness – 
whether another entity should trust me. Despite the normative connotation of 
the words (relating to a standard or norm), these terms are used to reflect 
behaviour – one acts as if one is trusting or acts in a way that is consistent 
with eliciting trusting behaviour from others, that is, trustworthiness. Choices 
that are made about whom to interact or play with, and whose expectations to 
fulfil, disappoint or ignore, determine the ‘network structure’ of the game (see 
Ch. 12). In game theoretic contexts, it is relevant to consider how the design 
of the game itself embodies trust, especially where contracts may be 
incomplete (Bacharach et al. 2001; Bacharach and Gambetta 2001; Bowles 
and Gintis 2000). Trust is essential to the functioning of the norms and 
standards that allow markets to function. 
Trust in games can be analyzed with reference to all the underlying data of 
the game: the set of ‘players’; their strategies or powers of action; their 
information; their motivations or pay-offs; and the solution concept used to 
summarize the information in the game. A common assumption is that the 
other players engaged in a game act rationally which allows their behaviour to 
be predicted. Much recent work represents trust as a strategic choice that is 
influenced by the credibility of information, that is, its provenance, and the 
degree to which others will believe our own communications, for example, 
threats and promises (Bowles and Gintis 2000; Guerra and Zizzo 2002; 
Hardin 1991). Research also suggests that the distribution of trust is a key 
factor in agent behaviour (see Box 2.15). 
Box 2.15 The distribution of trust 
Trust (trustworthiness and trusting behaviour) is a valuable property of complex 
interactive systems. From the economic point of view, it is not the level that 
matters so much as the distribution of trust. How trust is distributed governs 
expectations and the alignment of information, motivation and the power to act. A 
simple policy of maximizing trust may be myopic or even counterproductive. For 
example, customer trust in electronic commerce systems is advantageous, but it 
does not follow that more trust is better – a higher level of trust increases the 
possibilities of opportunistic behaviour by those that are trusted (see Ch. 12). 
Simple games representing stylized views of trust and their associated 
equilibria can be used to model agent behaviour as strategic behaviour; as the 
formation of player networks; and as hybrid games that combine elements of 
both approaches (see Ch. 12). A basic approach to game theoretic analysis is 
given by the coordination game in which players choose between high and 
low trust strategies. In such games, individuals are assumed to choose a single 
strategy for all their interactions (Axelrod 1984). This framework may be 
extended to consider a multiple period game in which cooperation or 
defection is a choice in each period for each player (see Ch. 12).  
Games can be used to suggest outcomes in terms of whether high trust or 
low trust equilibria pertain if all players interact with each other in a fully 
connected network. Trust is partially a collective property, depending on how 
individuals are linked, whom they trust and who trusts them. It is feasible to 
look at the influence of linkages of trust to see whether networks will form 
that provide optimal trust. These economic approaches to understanding trust 
or agent expectations are mirrored in the modelling of software agent-based 
behaviour in cyberspace and the way trustworthiness may be signalled (see 
Box 2.16 and Ch. 6 in this volume).  
When trust and crime are important there are externalities. These can be 
mitigated by precautions taken by the affected parties. The collective 
response (in civil, criminal or contract law) to market failure is to align the 
nature and amount of precaution with the assignment of liability for 
consequences (Shavell 1987). 
Varian (2002) considered the impact of liability on the incentives to offer a 
public good, such as ICT system reliability or trustworthiness. The results 
depend on how the provision of the public good relates to individual effort. 
They also depend on whether decisions to contribute to the provision of this 
good are taken simultaneously or in sequence. This has implications for the 
risks associated with computer viruses, spam and harmful or illegal content in 
cyberspace. 
Box 2.16 Signalling trustworthiness 
Economic theory relating to product safety and reliability distinguishes two 
strategies to signal trustworthiness. A firm wishing to convince customers of its 
reliability can provide extensive or minimal warranty protection. In the former 
case, the signal is credible because the warranty would be too expensive to offer 
otherwise, providing the assurance is reliable and inexpensive to exercise. The 
customer does not need to trust the firm, but the firm may need to trust the 
customer not to make frivolous claims. A well-known firm can credibly signal 
trustworthiness by providing unusually low levels of protection, since it places its 
reputation on the line by so doing. Trust in this interpretation is solely about the 
assessment of risk because the consumer has little control over the allocation of 
risk. Trustworthiness signalling can influence agent expectations (see Ch. 12). 
Precautionary activities, themselves, have externalities. Some have the 
effect of protecting others, for example, shutting down the offending 
communication. Some do not affect risk to others, for example, protecting 
one’s own machine. Others may transfer the risk or costs to others, for 
example, attacking those who appear to have sent offending messages. These 
issues interact with issues of industrial structure because they influence and 
are influenced by the degree of monopolization in the market. They also 
influence the prevalence, adequacy and ownership of standards and the nature 
of networking among market participants.  
  
In summary, in the economic view of trust, trust serves as a useful 
lubricant for establishing and maintaining networks of agents involved in 
activities in which mutual gain is a possibility. Achieving an overall increase 
in the level of trust is less relevant in achieving efficient outcomes or stable 
networks than is the distribution of trust that supports the setting of priorities 
for establishing trust relationships and which establishes a structure for 
negotiating the liabilities arising from interactions. Networks involving trust 
will tend towards equilibrium involving a high level or a low level of trust 
and agents will either rely on consistent behaviours or expect opportunistic 
behaviour. Aligning the institutional rules of cyberspace networks with the 
tendencies of a network may improve efficiency. The possibility of free riding 
may reduce the quality of a public good such as system dependability. 
Because it is possible for the independent actions of one member of a 
network to compromise the interests of others, cyberspace networks may need 
stronger rules for exclusion or for imposing sanctions on participants that 
breach the trust of others. 
2.4.3 Trust and Social Capital 
Trust is a major component of ‘social capital’ (Fukuyama 1995; Pollitt 2001; 
Putnam 2000). Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) developed the idea of social 
capital as a means of modernizing Marxist concepts of class reflecting the 
relational capital of elites. This concept can be linked to the positive effects 
expected from networks of trusted agents. The social capital idea has received 
considerable attention due to the efforts of Putnam (1993, 2000). He sought 
to explain differences in economic performance between Northern Italy and 
the mezzogiorno region and between regions within the US as the result of 
differences in the nature and density of non-economic relational associations 
in society (see Ch. 13 in this volume). 
Although many economists are sceptical of the social capital idea because 
of the causal ambiguity in the relation between non-economic social relations 
and economic performance (Sobel 2002), some economists have embraced 
the idea of exploring ‘trust’ as a feature of preferences (Glaeser et al. 2000; 
Knack and Keefer 1997). It can be argued that societies that engender and 
support a more complex and dense pattern of networked social relations may 
benefit from lower transaction costs and more robust assumptions about the 
unlikelihood of opportunistic behaviour. This approach helps understanding 
about how ‘trust’ can be extended between parties that are capable of 
opportunistic behaviour by creating a ‘web’ or ‘network of trust’ (Mansell et 
al. 2000). This would suggest that policies aimed at supporting the 
development of virtual communities in cyberspace would have a positive 
payoff in economic performance (Mansell and Steinmueller 2000; and see 
Ch. 13). 
This view is not uncontested since some would argue that the concepts of 
contract and trust are antithetical. Others point to a pragmatic inconsistency. 
Trust in incomplete contracts involves acting on the basis of incomplete 
information. Many trust-enhancing measures, for example, authentication 
mechanisms, add information and actually weaken trust. Contracts exist in a 
specific legal and social context that provides for monitoring, verification and 
enforcement. Where enforcement involves relationships between actors, 
hierarchies or other complex structures of trust may emerge, which introduce 
further complexity into the analysis of trust and economic performance 
(Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984).  
One reason that there are such differing perspectives on trust in cyberspace 
is related to whether the analysis of behaviour begins from an individualistic 
or egoistic perspective or a collective or societal perspective. This raises 
ethical issues, some of which we review in the next section. 
2.4.4 Ethics and Cyberspace 
Technologists sometimes make a distinction between the ‘real’ world and 
cyberspace. The spaces and means of access may be quite different, but 
research increasingly shows that many aspects of human behaviour remain 
constant (Mansell and Steinmueller 2000).16 It seems unlikely that the 
majority of people will alter their basic behaviours, ethical stances and 
morality when they enter cyberspace. In fact although criminals – or those 
who seek to exploit others – will think of new forms of attack, most people 
are likely to find ways of translating conventionally understood norms and 
practices into cyberspace. When people understand that there are certain 
ethical and moral requirements, they may be more likely to adopt and demand 
them. Helping them to acquire that understanding is a key challenge for crime 
prevention. 
For this reason, we need to consider the ethical standpoint from which it is 
feasible to argue that interventions in cyberspace to improve crime prevention 
are reasonable. O’Neill argues that a critical approach to practical reason 
“does not take the expression of the basic norms of a community or of one’s 
own personal commitments as intrinsically rational” (O’Neill 2000, p. 26). 
Instead, the standards for taking action should be whether the guidance 
provided to those with a capacity to act can be recommended universally 
without damage to others and whether they can be understood. Any measures 
to secure cyberspace through building trust and trustworthy systems raise 
numerous ethical issues. Standard ethical concepts map onto cyberspace in 
interesting ways (see Ch. 14 in this volume). This section considers ethical 
positions with respect to attempts to secure cyberspace. 
  
2.4.4.1 Trust and security 
In earlier sections we have seen that there are many definitions of trust and 
many perceptions as to likely actions under conditions of uncertainty in 
cyberspace. An enticing means of reducing uncertainty in cyberspace is to 
develop and implement security systems, but this raises ethical issues around 
the spread of a security infrastructure. What avenues will be cut off for those 
who do not wish to employ it? We have discussed the way security systems 
require some kind of identity authentication (and see Ch. 4). However, for 
many users, the charm of the Internet is precisely the ability to get away from, 
or play with, one’s identity. Every extension of power should require a 
justification and agreement as a result of a dialogue (Ackerman 1980), and 
the software code of the Internet controls its architecture and what actions are 
permissible (Lessig 1999). 
To question the extension of cyberspace security there needs to be a forum 
within which the sceptical can table their requirement for justification. 
However, given the global reach of the Internet enabling security measures to 
jurisdictions, then enabling a full cross-section of users to debate is very 
difficult. One strategy may be to place the burden of proof on those who wish 
to alter the principles upon which the Internet was founded, namely liberty 
and openness. On the other hand, from an argument based on John Stuart 
Mill’s (1869) work, On Liberty, it could be held that liberty and openness are 
the essentially important values after a certain level of cultural development 
has been achieved. This might imply that it is first of all essential to provide a 
cyberspace architecture in which privileged activities – selected on the basis 
of judgement by those with political power – such as science and commerce, 
can flourish, and only then should liberty become an overriding value. 
2.4.4.2 Rationality and value 
In the context of cyberspace, one notion of trust is a utilitarian notion 
developed by Luhmann (1979; and see Ch. 14 in this volume). This sees trust 
as a way of reducing complexity, by accepting the bona fides of agents rather 
than investigating them. The second is a moral notion of trust developed by 
Durkheim (1893/1984), which sees trust as inclusion into a value-laden 
society; if I trust you, I accept you as one that shares my values. Durkheim’s 
view is optimistic and conservative; Luhmann’s is rooted in self-interest. The 
Luhmann view is that trust is the effect of good behaviour and, therefore, 
ensuring trust requires providing incentives for good behaviour. The 
Durkheim view is that trust is the cause of good behaviour, and that the best 
strategy to ensure that people behave well is to trust them and make it clear to 
them what behaviour is acceptable (see Ch. 14). 
This argument mirrors a major ethical debate about the purpose of the 
Internet and the limits of its regulation. Castells (2001) and others argue that 
openness is deeply embedded in the architecture of the Internet.17 They 
suggest that cyberspace technology is inherently supportive of values such as 
passion, freedom, social worth, caring and creativity; values that are prevalent 
within the ‘hacker’ community. They argue that these values need to be 
defended in the face of efforts to achieve control for purposes such as crime 
prevention.  
Others, such as O’Siochru and Contanza-Chock (2003) and Surman and 
Reilly (2003), suggest that the picture is more complicated. While evidence 
shows that civil society organizations are making much greater use of 
cyberspace tools, the extent to which such use is dependent upon maintaining 
all of the original features of the Internet’s architecture is unclear. In addition, 
many uses of the Internet may be associated with actions across the spectrum 
of values and political aims. The relationships between the spread of the 
Internet and issues of privacy, vulnerability and security in the broader 
context of ethical and political considerations, mainly in the US, have been 
examined (Latham 2003). In the UK and with a more international 
orientation, empirical work has been undertaken on the use of the Internet for 
criminal activities, but it tends to focus on near-term developments and 
technologies rather than on the technological landscape that is likely to 
emerge in the coming decades (Thomas and Loader 2000; Wall 2001). 
Some argue that the governing values of the Internet, liberty and openness, 
are a stage through which the Internet had to move, but which may be 
transcended to allow other cyberspace activities such as commerce. Others 
argue that liberty and openness are essential and non-negotiable. The former 
group wants to ensure trust by altering cyberspace architectures to make bad 
behaviour more difficult. The latter wants to be allowed to imbue the Internet 
with their libertarian values. These two groups disagree about what 
constitutes good cyberspace behaviour and good faith and about when it is in 
one’s interests to trust (O’Hara 2004; and see Ch. 14). 
2.4.4.3 Trust and rationality 
There is also a spread of views about trust and rationality. The reciprocity 
required by trust is part of the uncertainty that trust tries to dispel. Under what 
conditions is it rational to assume that reciprocity will be respected? The 
narrower the conception of when it is rational to trust, the lower the level of 
trust in a society, and also the lower the level of betrayal. The various views 
are defined in terms of how egotistical the actors are assumed to be and how 
their identities influence their motives. Some views are more forward-
thinking and less egotistical than others (Hollis 1998; and see Table 14.1, Ch. 
14). There are numerous problems with the different positions and many are 
sceptical that they could sustain or nurture trust. Where identity is highly 
fluid, as in cyberspace, and subject to different conceptions, there is scope for 
  
very different views on cyberspace and its governing values. 
2.4.4.4 Liberalism and liberty 
Another ethical issue concerns the question of how much western bias 
informs debate on and policies for crime prevention and the security of 
networks. The idea that environments are definable in terms of local features 
(all of which may be virtual) stems from the philosophy of Descartes. The 
idea of people as individuals – and therefore of identity as something that can 
be fluid and self-defined – is notably western. Many argue that such positions 
cannot be sustained without threat of severe social breakdown and that the 
social context of interactions must be taken into account (Gray 1995; 
Mahbubani 2002). The positions – both historically and more recently – that 
are most commonly discussed in connection with cyberspace are all 
characteristically western liberal positions. Those that argue against western 
liberal hegemony assert that treating people as egotistical or of equal value is 
unrealistic. There must be some intermediate position.  
One line of argument is a principled one, which states that the essential 
aim of authorities should be to allow any actor to pursue his or her own 
conception of the good (if this does not interfere with others) (Ackerman 
1980; Rawls 1972). For cyberspace this means architectures allowing 
maximum freedom, including the freedom to be illiberal (Manasian 2003). 
This position takes liberalism as a universal ideology although it is a western-
centric idea. The second line of argument is pragmatic and conservative; 
liberal culture dominates the Internet and departing from liberal western 
principles would be a nod too far towards a multicultural agenda. Hence, 
western concerns about organized crime, cyber-terrorism or the growth of 
electronic commerce, should come first, even if other users are to be 
respected. The third response is a compromise. Liberalism’s conception of 
the ‘good’ is rooted in rights, but all parties around the world may not agree 
these. Retreating from the rights-based discourse, the issue becomes what 
privileges people should have in cyberspace. This, in turn, becomes a 
political problem in response to which a compromise may be reached.  
It is essential to allow access for non-western representatives to such 
negotiations on how to promote cyber trust and enable crime prevention. 
Positions on this ethical issue are closely linked to the role of the media and 
strategies for building awareness of the risks in cyberspace and about trust in 
cyberspace. If there is a need for an informed and reasoned debate in society, 
citizens need to be better informed about crime associated with cyberspace 
and about the way the Internet is permeating our lives. But there is a risk that 
concerns about cyberspace will become amplified. Thus, two uncertainties lie 
at the heart of the ethical dilemma – how will the general population engage 
in such a debate and how will the media report the issues? 
2.4.5 Implications for Cyberspace Trustworthiness and Trusting 
Behaviour 
Models for understanding trust between individuals or human agents of 
individuals operate within well-established social and ethical contexts. In the 
preceding sections we have seen that different assumptions underpin models 
developed within different disciplines. The advent of cyberspace raises the 
question of whether any distinction should be made between online and 
offline trust. Human societies support numerous contexts for trustworthiness 
and trusting behaviour and cyberspace adds new dimensions in that it may 
involve varying combinations of agents (two cases where this applies are 
discussed in Chs 5 and 6 in this volume). 
 
• Two human agents 
• A human and an artificial agent 
• Two artificial agents 
• One or more artificial proxies for human agents. 
 
The metaphor of trust in cyberspace could become over-extended, but 
without such a metaphor linkages with social and economic behaviour would 
be difficult. Cross-disciplinary research between the software engineering 
disciplines and the social sciences is needed to understand these linkages (see 
Ch. 5). 
As indicated in our earlier discussion about ethics and cyberspace it is 
uncertain whether a utilitarian or a moral notion of cyberspace trust is 
appropriate and whether either is mutually exclusive within the context of 
using cyberspace environments. We may take a utilitarian view when carrying 
out financial transactions, but a moral one when considering sharing open 
source software. This issue may affect approaches to DRM software. One 
view would be to treat it purely in utilitarian transactional terms, whereas the 
other would be make the content available for the common good, but to 
monitor and punish any abuse of agreed ethical principles. 
The nature of trustworthy knowledge acquisition in cyberspace is poorly 
understood. A number of approaches exist in the offline world, but it is not 
readily obvious that they translate to the cyberspace environment. The scale 
and volume of information to be acquired in the future are such that within 
the technologies being developed some understanding of the trustworthiness 
of the acquisition processes needs to be developed to contribute to trusting 
behaviour (see Ch. 5). 
In summary, the discussion in this section emphasizes that perceptions 
about the dangers of cyberspace are influenced by the media and that people’s 
social networks may amplify or attenuate such perceptions. Trust in 
  
cyberspace depends on many factors that need to be understood by 
technology developers and other stakeholders. Economic models of trust 
provide insights into the behaviour of human and non-human agents in 
cyberspace and it may be that aligning the rules of networks with the 
distribution of trust could improve the efficiency of cyberspace interactions. 
In addition, the development of social capital is an important consideration in 
fostering trusting behaviour and there is a wide range of views about whether 
actors in cyberspace will follow their self-interests or other motivations. 
2.5 APPLYING TRUST MODELS IN CYBERSPACE 
Two technology developments that are likely to be critical for the 
development of cyberspace are the deployment of software agent-based 
computing and the development of the semantic web. Each of these is 
examined here to assess how concepts of trust and risk are being modelled 
and whether there is reason to be concerned about knowledge management 
and the information aspects of cyberspace. 
It is clear that if future ICT systems are to become more dependable and 
secure there will need to be changes in the design and implementation of ICT 
components, hardware and software (see Ch. 3). They will need themselves to 
become more reliable and trustworthy. Many modern computer applications 
are open distributed systems in which the (very many) constituent 
components are spread throughout a network in a decentralized control 
regime that is subject to constant change throughout the system’s lifetime. 
Examples include peer-to-peer computing, the semantic web, the grid, web 
services, e-business, m-commerce, autonomic computing, and pervasive 
computing environments. In all of these cases there is a need to have 
autonomous components that act and interact in flexible ways in order to 
achieve their design objectives in uncertain and dynamic environments. Given 
this, agent-based computing has been advocated as the natural computation 
model for such systems (see Ch. 6).  
Knowledge technologies and the semantic web are enabled by recent 
technological developments that allow much more intelligent machine 
engagement with the documents, services and other objects on the World 
Wide Web. They manipulate and create knowledge, that is, usable 
information in a context, and we take developments in this area as a further 
case study to illustrate how concepts of trust are being applied that influence 
the future of cyberspace (see Ch. 5). 
2.5.1 Agent-based Systems and Trust 
The application of autonomous software agents, sometimes representing their 
human owners, in large-scale open distributed systems presents a number of 
new challenges. We focus specifically on the challenges that relate to the 
interactions in such systems. How do agent-based system designers decide 
how to engineer protocols (or mechanisms) for multi-agent encounters? How 
do agents decide with whom to interact? How do agents decide when to 
interact? 
As our discussion about trust in preceding sections has shown, it is 
impossible to reach a state of perfect information about the environment and 
the interaction partners’ properties, possible strategies and interests. Agents 
  
are faced with significant degrees of uncertainty in making decisions. Agents 
have to trust each other in order to minimize the uncertainty associated with 
their interactions, for example, a buyer has to trust that a seller will deliver 
goods in time, or a seller will have to trust an auction house to sell its goods 
at the highest possible price) (see Ch. 6). Trust can be defined in this context 
as: “A belief an agent has that the other party will do what it says it will 
(being honest and reliable) or reciprocate (being reciprocal for the common 
good), given an opportunity to defect to get higher payoffs” (see Ch. 6, p. x).  
In designing agent and open multi-agent systems, it is important to 
distinguish between individual-level trust (an agent believes its interaction 
partners are honest or willing to be reciprocal) and system-level trust (actors 
in the system are forced to be trustworthy by the rules of encounter, that is, 
protocols and mechanisms, that regulate the system).  
Individual-level trust between agents means endowing them with the 
ability to reason about the likely reciprocal nature, reliability or honesty of 
their counterparts. Trust models aim to enable agents to calculate the amount 
of trust they can place in their interaction partners. To calculate the degree of 
trust, agents need to gather some knowledge about their counterparts’ 
characteristics in many different ways, for example, through inferences drawn 
from the history of outcomes of multiple direct interactions with these 
partners or through indirect information provided by other agents.18 
System-level trust concerns the design of protocols and mechanisms of 
interactions, that is, the rules of encounter, including security. These 
interaction mechanisms need to be devised to ensure that those involved can 
be sure they will gain some utility if they rightly deserve it, that is, a 
malicious agent cannot tamper with the correct payoff allocation of the 
mechanism. We expect agents to interact using a particular mechanism only if 
it can be trusted. This highlights the need for protocols that ensure that the 
participants will find no better option than telling the truth and interacting 
honestly with each other (see Ch. 6). The state-of-the-art in this area with 
respect to multi-agent software systems is shown in Box 2.17. 
With the advent of open distributed systems, agents representing different 
countries, institutions or societies, will be interacting. This could give rise to 
a clash of norms and cultures that will result in software agents making the 
wrong assumptions about their counterparts, leading to distrust. Future agent-
based trust models will need to have a means of effectively modelling 
differences in expectations arising from differences in norms and cultures. 
One aspect of this challenge concerns the relationship between the data that 
agents encounter or collect and their meaning. 
 
Box 2.17 Trust in multi-agent software systems 
Trust models based on sociology, machine-learning techniques and game theoretic 
approaches have been shown to be useful in helping software agents to interact 
better. As indicated in Section 2.4, these models each look at different facets of the 
trust problem without relating to each other. A very small number of interaction 
protocols have been shown to be trustworthy because the computational 
complexity of interaction protocols can be a barrier to designing trustworthy 
interaction mechanisms.  
Security mechanisms provide a number of techniques to make interactions secure. 
However, they do not control the semantics of interactions beyond the line of 
defence provided by security policies and encryption techniques. Most trust 
models and interaction protocols do not cope effectively against strategic lying by 
agents. Most trust models and interaction protocols are not collusion-proof and 
agents can collude in order to exploit other agents or the system itself.  
Game theoretic approaches to studying interactions, require protocol designers to 
make many unrealistic assumptions about the environment and the social network. 
A more precise modelling of the context of interactions is needed and trust models 
and interaction protocols should be adapted to the dynamic context in which they 
are used (see Ch. 6). 
We examine developments in knowledge technologies next. 
2.5.2 Knowledge Technologies and the Semantic Web 
The major concerns for trust in cyberspace environments resulting from 
developments in this area are: (i) making sure that the input to knowledge and 
information manipulation processes is trustworthy and (ii) ensuring that the 
processes themselves are trustworthy, and their limits and margins for error 
are known and predictable (see Ch. 6). 
Operationalizing the concept of trust can be accomplished in many ways in 
the context of knowledge technology development. The goal is to create or 
maintain trust in the cyberspace domain and some of the approaches can be 
characterized as ‘tactics for trust’ (see Table 5.1, Ch. 5).  
There are costs and benefits associated with each of the tactics for 
establishing or maintaining trust. For instance, using knowledge technologies 
to manage knowledge more effectively implies the need for improved 
knowledge technologies. This, in turn, requires a better understanding of the 
knowledge technologies that will be implemented in the future and, in part, 
focusing research on this area of application. At present the technologies are 
immature so the cost of ownership is high. As they become better automated 
and ‘trustworthy’, it is expected that this cost will decline and their use will 
expand. 
The tactics for trust need to be combined in active trust management 
  
strategies (see Ch. 5). As a counterpart to the human behavioural approaches 
to risk and trust management (see Chs 10 and 11), there is a need to maintain 
flexible policies for managing trust where software is concerned. These 
include the collection of rich sets of metadata about knowledge sources and 
agents, and ontologies for expressing trust requirements. A physical analogy 
might be a library of books, catalogued by subject, authors and CVs, reviews 
of the books with reviewers’ credentials, cross references to other books not 
in the library, with similar metadata for them, all linked and available at any 
time from any place. Such information needs to be dynamically and 
automatically updated as new sources are ‘published’. 
Maintaining the distinction between trust and trustworthiness, so that 
signalling trustworthiness does not become detached from trustworthiness 
itself is crucial. Corritore et al. (2003) argue that trust is an act by the 
principal and trustworthiness a property of the agent. Where the principal and 
agent are ‘software agents’, such strategies are complex and demanding to 
maintain. We are already using primitive forms of such constructs in spam 
filters and privacy engines within browsers. It is also important to ensure that 
functionality is not sacrificed to trustworthiness. The scale of the information 
resource that will be available online for social, economic and academic 
purposes is growing exponentially. Any strategy for trustworthiness has to 
take into account such growth. Ensuring that privacy is sufficiently protected 
so as not to undermine trust is clearly important too (see Ch. 9).  
In the offline world branding and promoting a reputation are very 
effective. It appears that they transfer well as contributors to trustworthiness 
in cyberspace. What is less clear is how fragile they might be and open to 
different forms of criminal attack that are not available in the offline world, 
for example, mass attack, denial of service or masquerade. Effective 
procedures for the maintenance of knowledge bases will need to be developed 
to ensure that as sharing of knowledge in a controlled way becomes a major 
influence on commercial and social behaviour, the sources that are used are 
maintained and exploited in ways that ensure they can be trusted. At present 
there is very little understanding of the end-user’s perspective on these issues. 
We examine the results of the first large scale survey in the UK that examined 
how the experience of users with cyberspace tools and applications may be 
influencing their ideas about trust and the trustworthiness of cyberspace. 
2.5.3 Evidence of Trust in Cyberspace 
A problem confronted by research aimed at examining end-user perceptions 
of trust and the trustworthiness of cyberspace is that, as in the case of 
operationalizing trust for the development of software-agent based systems 
and knowledge management, it is difficult to define trust in a way that is 
meaningful for lay respondents to a survey. 
Definitions based on rational expectations and game theoretic models are 
difficult to apply in social surveys. However, a conventional definition of 
trust can be applied. Trust can be defined as: “a firm belief in the reliability or 
truth or strength etc. of a person or thing. ... a confident expectation. … 
reliance on the truth of a statement etc., without examination” (Oxford 
English Dictionary, see Ch. 7).  
This conventional definition of trust allows for the possibility that the use 
of cyberspace technologies might undermine trust and prevent people from 
obtaining electronic services (Guerra et al. 2003). One possibility is that the 
use of the Internet will undermine trust because it eliminates face-to-face 
interaction. Empirical evidence on this possibility is sparse and contradictory. 
Some researchers argue that trust may be undermined in electronic 
interactions because the reduced communication channel makes it harder to 
observe non-verbal physical cues (Wallace 2001).  
There is no definitive research on the impact of different media on trust.19 
Trust might, in fact, be enhanced by making effective use of the vast amount 
of information and new forms of online social networks that are available 
through cyberspace interactions (Ben-Ner and Putterman 2002). Generally, 
personalized interactions are perceived as being more trustworthy in the 
offline world than in cyberspace. Technology to support such interactions in a 
geographically independent way will become available in the near future. 
Understanding how this might affect trusting behaviour is likely to influence 
how these technologies are developed and operated (see Ch. 5). 
The relationship between information, uncertainty and trust is likely to 
vary along many dimensions including the extent of experience in using 
online forms of communication (MacKenzie 1999; and see Ch. 7). If trust as 
conventionally defined is closely related to a greater level of certainty or 
confidence in the reliability and security of the Internet, it is likely that trust 
will be enhanced as a person learns more about the technology. However, it is 
also the case that information can create, rather than reduce, uncertainty. 
Proximity or ‘experience’ with the Internet is one of many factors that 
could play an important role in perceptions of appropriate levels of trust in 
cyberspace. How much (dis)trust does the public place in cyberspace? How 
does cyber trust shape use of the Internet? In the US an empirical basis for 
examining the use and implications of the Internet for trust is being developed 
(Lohse et al. 2000; Lunn and Suman 2002). 
The Oxford Internet Institute at the University of Oxford conducted the 
first large-scale survey of Internet use in the UK in 2003, focusing on many 
issues including trust in cyberspace.20 The results of the survey with respect to 
issues of cyber trust are summarized in Box 2.18. 
  
Box 2.18 Results of first Oxford Internet Survey 
Results based on a survey of 2,030 respondents participating in a multi-stage 
random sample of the population, aged 14 and upwards, in England, Wales and 
Scotland shed initial light on public perceptions of the trustworthiness of the 
Internet and how levels of trust are related to an individual’s patterns of (non)use 
of the Internet over time. 
Using the conventional view of trust as a ‘confident expectation’, the survey 
examined expectations about the reliability and value of the Internet and related 
ICTs. The survey revealed wide variations in cyber trust between individuals. Few 
exhibit a blind faith in the Internet, but most people are reasonably confident – if 
guarded – in the information and people they are able to access over the Internet.  
Well over half – 59 per cent - of the respondents were using the Internet. This 
suggests that there is sufficient trust to support the continued diffusion of this 
technology, despite a general awareness of the potential risks entailed in exposure 
to unwanted mail, viruses and other potential risks.  
The Internet does appear to be an ‘experience’ technology. Experience on the 
Internet tends to engender a higher level of cyber trust. Users of the Internet have 
more certainty and more confidence in the information and people they can access 
than do non-users, and many non-users have no opinion about the Internet’s 
trustworthiness. Greater proximity to the Internet tends to instil more trust, to some 
extent, where ‘proximity’ is indicated by the use of the Internet over more years, in 
more ways and with greater expertise.  
Those who are most proximate often become more sceptical and aware of potential 
risks, conforming to the ‘certainty trough’ model. The presence of cyber trust is 
positively associated with the use of the web for electronic commerce. However, 
those who use the Internet more, for example, for shopping online, are somewhat 
more likely to expose themselves to spam, email and other bad experiences. This 
tends to undermine trust in the Internet and raise concerns about risks.  
Individuals with more formal education tend to be somewhat more sceptical of the 
information and people accessible on the Internet, but also somewhat less 
concerned about the risks of Internet use (see Ch. 7). 
This research highlights issues concerning cyber trust for which more 
evidence and analysis is needed to gain a better understanding of the 
underlying social dynamics and learning processes. A surprisingly small 
percentage of users reported bad experiences on the Internet. This suggests 
that it is the right time, before problems with Internet use such as spam 
become more widespread, to take initiatives to reduce the likelihood of more 
users experiencing greater difficulties. Research on the co-evolutionary nature 
of human, organizational and technological systems is needed to underpin 
effective policies towards cyber trust and crime prevention.  
All technologies are social in the sense that they are designed, produced, 
used and governed by people (Dutton 1999; Dutton et al. 2003). 
Understanding relevant social and institutional dimensions should be a key 
priority in addressing the way these technologies affect trust, crime and 
related issues (see Ch. 7).  
This is especially important because trust in the Internet among certain 
categories of users, such as the less affluent who have less access to the 
Internet, is lower. For these groups, experience in using the Internet has a 
particularly disproportionate positive impact, increasing their trust in the 
Internet and lessening their preconceived concerns about risks. Education and 
exposure to the Internet may offer a general strategy for coping with the risks 
and threats to the perceived trustworthiness of this technology. However, as 
education and exposure to ICTs are skewed towards higher socio-economic 
groups this could reinforce the ‘digital divide’ in access to the Internet. 
Advances such as broadband Internet may exacerbate this divide. Initiatives 
to enhance the perceived trustworthiness of the Internet may be warranted, 
but such efforts will create a tension, competing against other values, such as 
privacy, which could be threatened by some trust-enhancing services (see Chs 
9 and 14).  
Other empirical evidence suggests that in many advanced industrial 
countries and in international organizations trust is a crucial factor that 
influences the future development of electronic transactions in cyberspace 
(Raab 1998; PIU 2002), and that more needs to be known about the public’s 
concern about how their personal information is used and protected (6 1998). 
Most survey research into attitudes towards privacy and the processing of 
personal data is of variable quality (Bennett and Raab 2003). A MORI (2003) 
survey in the UK revealed considerable ignorance on the part of citizens 
about what happens to their personal data when it is used by public agencies. 
These studies need to be complemented by more comparable and systematic 
evidence about why people trust organizations, what specifically they trust 
organizations to do or not to do, how privacy attitudes relate to risk 
perception and how people evaluate the trustworthiness of cyberspace and 
public and private organizations. 
In summary, software designers need to consider individual and system-
level trust when they design multi-agent computer systems. The existing 
models of trust are inadequate and there is a need for further work in this 
area. However, no single tactic with respect to knowledge technologies is 
sufficient for ensuring appropriate levels of trust in the knowledge 
management process. In addition, the way that users experience cyberspace is 
only beginning to be studied empirically in the UK and there is a need for 
comparative and systematic research to strengthen the evidence base in this 
area. 
2.6 CYBERSPACE MARKETS AND POLICY CONTEXTS 
  
Incentives for investing in the deployment of more trustworthy networks and 
applications depend substantially on the dynamics of the market and how 
markets interact with legislation (and its enforcement) and policy 
intervention. We examine the economic drivers of cyberspace technology and 
service markets and the European legislative context in this section, focusing 
particularly on privacy protection. 
In order to understand the evolutionary dynamics that will influence how 
the technical components of cyberspace develop in the market, we need to 
consider the special characteristics of these markets. Economic theory does 
this by focusing on expectations about the reputations and actions of firms in 
the market that supply the technologies (see Ch. 12).  
The future of cyber trust and crime prevention in the UK also has to be 
seen in a global context and, particularly, in terms of the impact of the 
existing legislative environment and crime prevention strategies. The need for 
additional measures, for new policy deliberation fora and for investment in 
research must be addressed with full awareness of the current constraints on 
and opportunities for crime. Deliberations about how to build trust in 
cyberspace, to alleviate perceptions of risk and to mitigate opportunities for 
crime invoke considerations of the need for, and feasibility of, both individual 
privacy protection and collective security. Therefore, we also focus 
specifically on privacy protection and the issue of social equity (see Ch. 9). 
2.6.1 The Economics of Emerging Cyberspace Markets 
An industrial structure, conduct and performance (SCP) analysis is helpful in 
understanding how markets for ICT systems and services are likely to evolve 
and the implications for cyber trust and crime prevention. The SCP 
framework is helpful in considering how reputation and the expectations that 
it engenders relate to market competition. To maintain their reputation and 
belief in this reputation, that is, trust, firms have incentives to use trust to 
create or consolidate their market power. From an economic viewpoint, 
reputation is constructed from prior experience and the possibility always 
exists of exploiting reputation by engaging in opportunistic behaviour (see 
Ch. 12). 
The asymmetry of information between firms and their customers can lead 
to customer ‘lock-in’ which reinforces the emergence of dominant firms. 
Opportunities exist for influencing competition through the use or misuse of 
trust in horizontal, vertical and networked market relationships involving: (i) 
the construction or opportunistic use of trust; (ii) the use of strategies to 
influence trust by attempting to ‘signal’ quality or risk; and (iii) by changes to 
liability rules that assign risk and thus can either reinforce or obviate the need 
for trust (Ch. 12). 
In horizontal relations, cyberspace changes the scope for collusive 
behaviour. Firms competing in electronic marketplaces have expanded 
opportunities for using anonymity to cloak their actions if they depart from 
collusive agreements and, in some cases, a global platform for their activities. 
This could increase the likelihood of defection – and thus the need to rely on 
trust (Belleflamme and Bloch 2001). A second cyberspace influence is the 
scope for rapid and effective detection and response to defection due to 
improved information.  
Trust may also be critical to vertical relationships, those involving input 
markets, access provision and retail sales to consumers, which involve search, 
payment, fulfilment and follow-up stages. New technologies have the 
potential to increase market competition by augmenting consumer search 
either directly, by empowering users, or, indirectly, through strengthening the 
capacities of intermediaries. It is not obvious, however, that intermediaries 
will act solely in consumer’s interests – they may seek to exploit consumers 
or collude with their suppliers. The way that the various components of 
market exchanges in cyberspace may favour concentration is suggested in 
Box 2.19. 
Box 2.19 Forces for cyberspace market concentration 
Achieving trust in cyberspace payments favours the prominence of financial 
intermediaries. This may become a force for increasing market concentration. A 
firm’s prominence also increases risk by making a larger target for fraudulent 
activities, that is, ‘phishing’ attacks on online banking sites and transactions 
service providers (The Independent 2003). Market prominence may reinforce 
concentration in the fulfilment phase where the selling party may be located in 
another (even an unknown) jurisdiction in which pursuing consumers’ rights may 
be difficult or expensive. The follow-up stage of relations with consumers also 
highlights the importance of signalling. Verified information (for example, quality 
certification by independent third parties) or assurance may advantage players with 
greater capacities to invest in these signals. This may favour increased market 
concentration (see Ch. 12). 
In oligopolistically competitive environments where the market is 
dominated by a small number of suppliers that are able to exert control over 
supply and price, such as those characterizing many cyberspace markets, 
firms may attempt to signal their relative trustworthiness by calling attention 
to problems encountered in doing business with their competitors. They may 
do so even though this may reduce trust in the market as a whole. 
Certification is an attractive alternative, but depends on the reliability of the 
certifying authority. Much recent literature on trusted third parties, cyber-
notaries and Internet governance concerns the relative merits of competitive 
and coordinated certification.21 While such third parties are regarded as 
essential to effective competition in electronic markets (Williamson 2000), at 
  
present the effectiveness of a market in certification services is uncertain.  
The increasingly heavy information content of goods and services 
delivered over the Internet is an important consideration for the evolution of 
cyberspace markets. They have the classic problem of incomplete 
information.22 A relatively high level of trust is required – perhaps on both 
sides – to fit such transactions into the relatively anonymous framework of 
retail commerce and this raises many issues for the technical means of 
securing identity and authenticity. In addition, cyberspace consists of many 
tiered networks and relationships and these have a major impact on the 
strength of demand for security precautions in the market. Demand for 
particular security solutions will be strongly influenced by the costs involved 
in switching between products on the market (see Box 2.20). 
Box 2.20 Networking and switching costs 
A major source of network relations involves economic entities that produce 
complements rather than substitutes (Katz and Shapiro 1994). In a variety of 
cyberspace markets including software and telecommunication services, 
incumbents have an incentive to maximize, and potential entrants to minimize, the 
costs of switching between networks. ‘Churn’ can undermine trust in the stability 
of the market and reduce suppliers’ incentives to invest in durability, dependability 
and continuity. Proprietary standards may serve to stabilize these markets at the 
cost of reduced market competition. The first-mover advantage of leading firms 
and the need to capture suppliers of complementary technologies or services may 
lead firms to reduce security barriers to developers, share information with them, 
and shift the cost, complexity and liability burdens of security to customers. 
Inferior security precautions may drive out good ones (Anderson 2003; and see 
Ch. 12). 
It is mainly market-led developments that will enable the spread and wider 
use of cyberspace technologies and influence their dependability. The rate at 
which technical developments leave the laboratory will be strongly influenced 
by the strategies of firms and the variety of products on the market. In turn, 
the legislative and policy frameworks that we examine next will influence the 
supply of and demand for more secure technologies.  
Economic analysis tends to endogenize trust – to treat it as an aspect of the 
functioning of economic systems where the calculations are far removed from 
the intuitive notion of trusting behaviour. For individuals, the decision to trust 
another or to behave in a trustworthy way is analyzed in terms of expected 
costs and benefits. The economic view of trust includes a rational 
commitment to limited rationality and to considerations of monitoring and 
enforcement. From this perspective, goods and services that enhance trust are 
valuable products and this extends to the provision of trust and identity 
services. These are information goods and the economics of incomplete 
information is relevant to analysis of the problems of hidden information and 
hidden action. Institutions that permit credible or verifiable signals 
(assurance) and informal institutions (reputations) can improve efficiency, 
and specific contractual forms can align incentives. Trust is also a public 
good. A person cannot fully ‘own’ trust or exact payment for it and it is 
possible to ‘free-ride’ on the trust or trustworthiness of others. To the extent 
that trust is costly, it will thus be underprovided (see Ch. 12).  
Because trust is bound up with expectations, the incompleteness of 
information, of markets and of contracts, is critical. This suggests a role for 
self-regulatory mechanisms (for example, open standards, reputations) and 
for appropriate allocation or low-cost trading of liabilities. Other aspects of 
trust enhancement may be provided by public or open, self-regulatory bodies. 
The sustainability of trust relationships in cyberspace markets may depend on 
asymmetry among the participants – in such cases, ‘improvements’ that 
reduce this asymmetry (such as the provision of identical information to both 
sides) may actually undermine trust. 
If people choose trust in the face of ‘exogenous’ risks, for example, of loss 
due to accident or mistake, they can get locked in to high or low trust 
behaviour independently of whether such behaviour is collectively efficient. 
If crime is added to the model, the rule of law may break down and criminal 
behaviour may become the prevailing practice. This depends on how people 
are connected: in fully-connected or symmetric situations, behaviour is likely 
to be homogeneous. Where networks are very asymmetric, a form of stable 
diversity is possible, with ‘small worlds’ or semi-private groups enjoying very 
different levels of trust (see Ch. 12). 
Trust may be viewed as a societal norm or convention. The stability of 
high trust behaviour does not depend on whether it is efficient, but rather on 
the balance between temptation and exposure. It may be less costly to help a 
population to evolve from low trust lock-in than to force them into high trust 
equilibrium. The results are significantly different when crime is added to the 
picture – the policy interventions required to ‘escape’ the low trust outcome 
may need to be both more extensive and more precise, and there is a danger 
of undermining the rule of law and getting locked in to ‘criminal equilibrium’ 
(see Ch. 12). 
2.6.2 The Legislative and Policy Context – Privacy Protection 
The evolution of the UK’s crime prevention strategies will in part result from 
international cooperation. Some observers are concerned that the spread of 
global networks is outstripping the pace of law makers (Goodman et al. 
2002). Although considerable international work is underway in this area, 
there are few signs that there will be efforts to adopt a formal treaty (Bryen 
2002). This means that there is unlikely to be a clear international framework 
  
within which to consider the implications of crime prevention strategies for 
privacy as cyberspace develops. 
In the European Union a very high priority is being given to ensuring that 
Europe achieves competitiveness in the global knowledge-based economy. 
The Union’s Lisbon strategy outlined policies, measures and actions that are 
expected to strengthen Europe’s performance by accelerating the transition to 
the knowledge-based economy, “while preserving – and modernizing – 
Europe’s unique social welfare model and decoupling economic growth from 
environmental damage” (European Commission 2003, p. 31). This intention 
to stimulate economic growth depends partly on leadership in the 
development and use of ICTs in ways that are both efficient and socially 
valued.  
In some areas, such as technical standards and organizational practices to 
achieve improved risk management and crime reduction, the UK is well-
placed to take the lead. It is argued by some that any measures (formal 
legislative or self-regulatory) that might discourage the early commercial 
introduction of advanced applications that have not been fully certified for 
dependability, could slow the pace of ICT innovation and reduce the 
competitiveness of the European economy. Others argue that it is essential to 
create economic incentives for cyber-technology suppliers and end-users to 
invest in greater levels of dependability and security even if this may slow the 
rate of diffusion of the most advanced technologies. 
The parameters of the European Union’s existing legislative framework, 
which affects decisions about cyber trust and crime prevention, are complex 
and involve numerous interdependencies. At the European Union level 
relevant legislation comes from directives on privacy and electronic 
communications, electronic commerce, telecommunication data protection 
and consumer policy. As European legislation is transposed into the UK’s 
legislation its combination with specific laws where the UK retains full 
national jurisdiction, is creating a veritable jungle of law making.23 These 
combinations can produce contradictory outcomes: in some cases they foster 
greater privacy protection, while in others they sanction measures that, for 
crime prevention purposes, alter the extent to which information about 
individuals is revealed. 
In the area of privacy protection, which has a major impact on the future 
deployment of cyberspace technologies, the opportunities for crime and the 
feasibility of certain crime prevent strategies, there are four main classes of 
information privacy instruments: international instruments, national 
legislation, self-regulation and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs), but 
also pressure-group activity, citizen and consumer education, market-based 
practices and contracts (Bennett and Raab 2003; and see Ch. 9).  
The interdependence and interaction between the various instruments is 
not very well understood. In the UK, for example, the Information 
Commissioner has powers regarding the promotion and promulgation of 
codes of practice, and also contributes to policy-making and statute-formation 
within government. The Information Commissioner’s responsibilities bring 
this office into relationships with the media, pressure groups, technology 
designers and others whose activities affect privacy outcomes in a variety of 
ways. There is a growing need for a more holistic approach to regulatory 
policy and practice in the light of complex relationships and outcomes for 
privacy protection and crime prevention (Bennett and Raab 2003). We 
examine the case of privacy protection and cyber trust to illustrate important 
ways in which policy developments in this area are likely to influence crime 
prevention strategies in the future. 
2.6.2.1 Cyber trust, crime prevention and privacy protection 
The development of cyberspace, including software agent-based computing 
and many knowledge management applications for cyberspace, has drawn 
considerable attention to the need for protection against the privacy-invading 
processing of personal information – “For the general public as well as large 
swathes of the policy classes, … what baffles us often frightens us. What 
frightens us often stimulates, as well as feeds on, lack of trust in whatever it is 
that causes us to worry about our privacy” (Ch. 9, p. x). This observation is 
confirmed by studies on the public perception of risk (see Ch. 8). 
The underpinning of the conventional privacy paradigm rests on 
assumptions derived from liberal political philosophy and epistemology. Civil 
society is assumed to comprise relatively autonomous individuals who need a 
modicum of privacy in order to be able to fulfil the various roles of the citizen 
in a liberal democratic state (Westin 1967). Individuals are assumed to know 
their interests in privacy. Toward the end of the 19th century in the US, 
Warren and Brandeis (1890, pp. 219-20) defined privacy as “the right to be 
let alone” and argued that “the protection of society must come mainly 
through a recognition of the rights of the individual. Each man is responsible 
for his own acts and omissions only”.  
Surveys on privacy in many western countries suggest that people 
generally have high, and increasing, levels of concern about privacy (Bennett 
1992; Bennett and Raab 2003). Privacy is taken to be something that ‘we’ 
once had, but that is now being denied to us by public and private 
organizations employing the latest tools of cyberspace. Popular culture and 
the mass media often amplify the public’s concern (see Ch. 8). This 
conventional paradigm has encouraged the policy goal of giving individuals 
greater control over the information about them that is collected, stored, 
processed and disseminated by public, and in some cases, private 
organizations. The paradigm and its assumptions underpin the doctrine of 
  
‘fair information principles’ (FIPs), which has been codified in national data 
protection or information privacy laws, including the UK’s Data Protection 
Act 1998, voluntary codes, and standards and guidelines. The notion of 
balance is a key feature of policy responses in this area because privacy must 
be balanced against other rights and obligations (Raab 1999; see Ch. 9). 
Critiques of this paradigm come from a number of perspectives as suggested 
in Box 2.21. 
Box 2.21 Critiques of the privacy paradigm 
Critiques come from those who argue that the possessive-individualist implications 
of privacy should be rejected because this approach gives too little weight to 
community interests. Some argue that this serves to legitimize personalized 
information systems and to extend social control in ‘surveillance societies’. The 
importance of privacy as a value for democratic society beyond the single 
individual or aggregate needs to be considered (see Ch. 9). 
Because of its emphasis on procedural due process and on an 
individualistic construct of the value of privacy, it is difficult to raise 
distributional issues and equity concerns within the conventional privacy 
paradigm. It is important to ascertain who enjoys what privacy, and why; and 
who does not, and whether an uneven distribution of data protection is 
justifiable on social and political grounds. The privacy paradigm does not 
address the distribution of privacy protection in terms of gender, ethnicity, 
social class, age, income or other typical socio-economic and demographic 
categories (see Ch. 9).  
A better understanding of the distributional characteristics of privacy 
protection would provide an evidence base for consideration of whether 
inequalities can be justified and whether public policy and its implementation 
can alter them. Privacy protection could be treated as an element of social 
policy and debated in terms of alternatives such as public or private 
provision, costs and benefits, responsibilities and entitlements, and the best 
way to ‘deliver’ privacy (Bennett and Raab 2003; Regan 1995, 2002; 
Schoeman 1992; and see Ch. 9). This issue is particularly important when we 
consider the way crime prevention is used to protect citizens from 
infringements of privacy and threats to their identities. 
Existing data and privacy protection legislation aims to ensure consent for 
data storage, assurance that the data collected are necessary and that matching 
up of personal records, such as health and insurance records, with police data 
does not occur. However, the matching of information from different sources 
can be the basis for judgements about criminality. Despite assurances against 
the secondary use or linking of personal data, some people have little trust in 
those that currently and in the future will manage their data.  
Box 2.22 Identity and identity cards 
Supporters of compulsory identity cards in the UK maintain that around 90 per 
cent of the population already carry identifying information on plastic cards, and 
an ID card would be more convenient resulting in the necessity for fewer cards to 
be carried. Card holders exercise ‘informed consent’ regarding their cards. 
However, combining information on one card would potentially facilitate the 
linking together of different pieces of information about an individual’s identity. 
The implications of this need to be considered in the light of the fact that consent 
to reveal a ‘piece of ourselves’ in one context does not necessarily imply consent 
in another context (Rogerson and Pease 2003). 
In addition, few of the most frequently used websites meet basic privacy 
standards (Electronic Privacy Information Centre 1997). Although cookies 
can be disabled, most people do not have the technical expertise to do this 
and know little about firewalls and other protection mechanisms (Rogerson 
and Pease 2003). Many of the tools being developed for use in cyberspace 
such as encryption, digital signatures, digital pseudonyms and anonymous re-
mailers are also available to criminals and terrorists. It may also be the case 
that too great a focus on limiting encryption may be at the expense of more 
effective, yet less intrusive, crime prevention interventions. This may also 
apply to the excessive use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance 
as discussed in Box 2.23. 
Box 2.23 CCTV surveillance and crime prevention 
Unimaginative implementation of CCTV may be contributing to concerns 
associated with the extension of its use. von Hirsch (2000) recommends that 
CCTV should be limited to the tracking of activity within a specific location over 
time, providing a record of activity for inspection when, and only when, an offence 
is known to have taken place. Constant surveillance involves growing intrusion of 
privacy and the crime prevention benefits need to be sufficiently high to justify 
this and also should directly benefit those being monitored. The effectiveness of 
CCTV as a crime prevention mechanism has not been empirically demonstrated 
(Welsh and Farrington 2002). The use of CCTV may lead to more self-policing as 
people aim to avoid being wrongly identified as criminals (Palmer 2000). CCTV 
can be used to track individuals using human or software agents to identify faces, 
suspicious behaviour or a potentially criminal ‘gait’. This raises issues of the ethics 
of crime prevention and whether class or other interests shape efforts designed to 
prevent crimes (Rogerson and Pease 2003). . 
Ekblom (1996) argues that the goal should be to reduce crime to 
‘tolerable’ levels, while Kleinig (2000) suggests that a level of crime must be 
tolerated if it cannot be diminished without incurring unacceptable privacy 
intrusions. Establishing what is ‘unacceptable’ is partly a matter for empirical 
research on citizen’s beliefs and preferences, but it is also a matter for ethical 
debate. There are different interests and vantage points as to what constitutes 
  
‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ levels of protection, as suggested by the 
following: 
there is evidence that citizens are reacting to new anti-terrorism surveillance 
measures by calling for more checks and balances within their own democratic 
state structures. However, market agents are utilizing new technologies to collect 
personal data, mostly in the absence of effective enforcement of privacy protection 
legislation, in order to financially benefit from their further processing and use 
(IPTS 2003, p. 19). 
Crime prevention measures to tackle crime linked to global networks in the 
future will rely on models that yield predictions and crime scenarios (Levi 
2001). The perception of risk in cyberspace and of the acceptability of using 
intrusive technologies to monitor potentially criminal behaviour may become 
amplified or may be attenuated depending on a wide variety of factors, many 
of which have come to light as a result of the review of existing scientific 
evidence. It seems clear, however, that much more will need to be done to 
ensure that cyberspace developments do not lead to the exacerbation of 
existing criminal opportunities or to new ones.  
The evidence reviewed in this section indicates that the economic 
dynamics of cyberspace markets tend towards horizontal and vertical 
integration. There are numerous opportunities for lock-in to less than optimal 
systems, and the costs of networking and switching affect technology supplier 
and user incentives to invest in secure technologies. The legislative and 
policy contexts for cyberspace development are complicated by the need for 
cooperation at global, regional and national levels and by interdependency 
between the policy instruments available. This is particularly apparent in the 
area of privacy protection, which should be considered in the light of social 
policy concerns about equity and the varying types of protection available to 
different categories of cyberspace users. Informed consent and anonymity are 
involved in the use of identity cards and surveillance as means of crime 
prevention and, there is not sufficient empirical evidence available to back up 
claims about the effectiveness of these approaches. 
2.7 CYBER TRUST AND CRIME PREVENTION –  
KEY ISSUES AND LESSONS 
In this section, we highlight the key issues and lessons from the scientific 
evidence reviewed in the preceding sections of this chapter and in the 
chapters that follow. We recapitulate the earlier sections without the detail in 
order to emphasize those areas where there is a need for measures to 
encourage more trustworthy cyberspace systems and improved strategies for 
crime prevention. In most cases, such measures will need to be underpinned 
by a stronger cross-disciplinary research effort. 
The sections in this chapter offer many insights into the interrelationships 
between the human and technical components of cyberspace. These need to 
be distilled to highlight where there are gaps in understanding and where 
there are areas of consensus or controversy over future developments. We 
have stressed that cyberspace is a complex human and technical system. This 
observation is being accepted increasingly by experts and non-experts alike. 
What is much less well understood by stakeholders, including cyberspace 
system developers and users, is that the whole of this system is subject to 
unpredictable emergent behaviour, which may yield unintended results. This 
means that the balance between the anticipation of, and scanning for, new 
problems leading to reactions is likely to favour the latter. More will need to 
be invested in scanning for new forms of criminal activity, enabling versatile 
responses and ensuring that, in cases where remedies fail, there is sufficient 
redundancy in the system. 
This means that at any given time, parts of the system will be relatively 
stable while other parts are not.24 It also means that there will always be 
ambiguity about the interpretation of the results of research. This is because 
the co-evolution of all the components of cyberspace is subject to a large 
number of possible emergent outcomes. This observation has particular 
consequences for interventions aimed at improved crime prevention because 
interventions for other purposes may confound crime prevention. 
Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence from existing studies of cyberspace 
developments and, more generally, from research in related areas of science 
and technology, to draw inferences about the outcomes associated with the 
most likely future developments. In the face of uncertainty and the need to 
strengthen the evidence base in key areas, decisions about the most effective 
crime prevention strategies must be considered in the light of ethical 
considerations and principles that are derived from plausible theories. 
The existing scientific evidence can be applied to clarify some of the 
interdependencies between the human and technical components of 
cyberspace, especially in areas that have achieved a degree of stability. This 
suggests how interventions in cyberspace are likely to reverberate throughout 
  
the whole social and technical system, locally and globally. Our review of 
developments in cyberspace technologies and components of the social 
system demonstrates that – in nearly every area – there are new opportunities 
for criminal activity. Strategies to mitigate these involve numerous trade-offs 
and choices, some of which we consider in this section.  
As the dynamics of the cyberspace system unfold, much will need to be 
done to build confidence both in people and in the ‘mechanics’ of cyberspace. 
As electronic services of all kinds continue to evolve, people will appraise 
cyberspace threats in different ways and ascribe to them quite different 
meanings. The variety of responses will depend on the way various people 
value the consequences of perceived threats. Therefore, a better 
understanding of the relationships between human factors, risk and trust is 
essential for the future security of cyberspace.  
So far, relatively little attention has been given to the analysis of public 
perceptions of cyberspace risk. This is a major gap in the evidence base.25 We 
can infer, however, from studies of the public perception of risk in other 
fields of science and technology that there is a complex set of risk factors. 
This research indicates that future problems and perceived dangers in 
cyberspace could be interpreted by the public as a failure of the technical 
system, as a failure on the part of system designers and users or as a failure in 
the governance model. It is also essential to bear in mind that reported 
perceptions of risk may not be aligned with the trust that people actually place 
in cyberspace technologies or in the individuals (and software agents) and 
institutions that govern cyberspace. 
It is clear from research undertaken by organizations across Europe that 
the solutions to cyber trust and crime prevention in a pervasive computing 
environment will be quite different from those in use today. There will be a 
need for a new paradigm for cyberspace security, even in the face of the 
current situation in which the majority of potential users of cyberspace 
services and products have a poor understanding of security.  
In Chapter 1 of this volume we posed several questions: 
 
• What sorts of cyber trust issues will be of dominant concern – what 
will be the new kinds of vulnerability and how will the risks of 
cyberspace be perceived? 
• How will the overall structure of the emerging system drive the uptake 
of cyber trust technologies? 
• What kinds of interventions might be made to influence the system’s 
dynamics for the purpose of improving cyber trust and crime 
prevention? 
 
Some answers are provided in the discussion that follows, but it is 
important to remember that addressing these questions within existing 
paradigms of trust, security and technology is unlikely to be enough to 
alleviate concerns about potential threats in this environment. A strengthened 
cross-disciplinary research effort is needed to create a better foundation for 
understanding key facets of the technical and human dimensions of 
cyberspace. 
2.7.1 Dependable Software Systems and Commercial Issues 
Part 2 of this volume includes reviews about the dependability of pervasive 
and complex computing systems and the development of various means of 
identity verification and authentication of users of these systems. A 
deployment gap is associated with software development methods and 
procedures. These are currently insufficiently robust to produce a more 
trustworthy network infrastructure and service applications. The 
dependability or ‘trustworthiness’ of a computer system refers to the ability to 
avoid computer system failures beyond an ‘acceptable’ level.  
One key issue then is the level of failure that in the eyes of users would be 
regarded as being unacceptable. Another is the management of the software 
engineering process in which there are numerous dependencies and 
constraints. In response to the first issue, there is a need to develop fault 
prevention and fault removal techniques that maintain satisfactory service in 
the face of attacks on networks. In relation to management, there must be 
good project leadership and close involvement of the customer to ensure that 
the system meets required levels of dependability, and standards must be 
established against which system dependability performance can be 
measured. 
In large-scale software engineering projects there must be flexibility in the 
development process to allow responses to specific customer requirements 
and changes in the external environment. This means that it is essential that 
appropriately educated and very experienced people work on the design and 
implementation of large software projects in order to avoid low levels of 
system dependability. If future networked computer systems are to attain 
higher levels of dependability or trustworthiness, considerably greater 
attention will need to be given both to commercial issues, which influence 
customer willingness to invest in such systems, and risk management. 
Improved ways of managing the components of large-scale software projects 
will be needed. Whether these components are developed using proprietary or 
open source software code, and whether they rely on re-usable code, the 
problems of managing their aggregation/disaggregation processes will 
remain. 
It may become technically feasible to develop warrantable software and 
  
systems. This would require a software system development approach that: (i) 
enables the likely impact on system dependability of all design and 
deployment decisions and activities to be assessed throughout the system life 
cycle; and (ii) caters for system adaptation and the realities of huge, rapidly 
evolving, pervasive systems (see Ch. 3).  
In this context, the commercial relationship between those that commission 
a project and its developers and deliverers involves financial, functional and 
time risks, all of which need to be managed in an equitable manner. 
Contracting regimes may be based on fixed price or cost plus arrangements, 
but because of the difficulties of estimation and resource allocation and 
unexpected component integration problems, adherence to a rigid structure of 
contracting regimes often contributes to the failure of such projects. ‘Best 
practice’ codes can play a role, but adjustments and flexibility are needed in 
conjunction with a change manager with a very high level of expertise, 
experience and education. 
Incentives for all parties involved in complex software projects to adopt 
‘best practice’ are essential, as is the maintenance of an intimate collaborative 
relationship on all aspects of a software project (Collins 2004). In addition to 
the methods for managing technical, financial and timescale risks, software 
development involves two additional risks. The first involves estimation. The 
lack of any physical legal constraints introduces considerable uncertainty as 
to how long a piece of software will take to develop.  
To address this risk there is a need to achieve a balance between delivering 
functionality within the expected time and cost while not bounding the 
creativity of the software developer to deliver functional code. At present 
software development is seen as a mix of art and science. The challenge for 
software engineers in attempting to provide solutions to large complex 
problems is that the solution will also inevitably be very complex. In addition, 
the processes by which such complex artefacts are created are complicated 
and ill-defined. Concentration on the modularity of functionality is leading to 
a neglect of the connectivity between the software modules (see Box 2.24).  
Box 2.2.4 A holistic view of modularity 
A holistic view of modularity and the links between modules is essential if the 
implicit decomposition that modularity implies is to be successful. Several 
engineering disciplines adopt holistic approaches to the design of large complex 
structures, including software engineering. While there are no physical laws, and 
the constraints are less rigorous and well-shared within the project, it might benefit 
software engineering methods if the holistic approaches of other disciplines are 
evaluated for their applicability in the software engineering process (Collins 
2004). 
The second specific risk in large-scale software lies in the difficulty of 
describing accurately the relationship between critical elements of the 
requirements. The use of prototyping, rapid application development 
approaches or other approaches to risk reduction in areas of critical 
uncertainty within a project is essential. It is people in the main that write 
software. There is research ongoing looking at how software could be used to 
generate software, but up to now automatic software generation tools have not 
met with widespread success. For the foreseeable future, people will continue 
to play a critical role in the generation of software. Greater efforts are needed 
to encourage a holistic view of software engineering in order to reduce the 
risks of software unreliability. Alongside this, there are divergent views about 
whether open source software developments will produce software that has 
greater reliability and dependability when employed on a large scale and as a 
component of hybrid proprietary/open source applications. 
Achieving greater dependability of complex ICT systems in the future will 
require greater investment in training and education. On a global scale 
software engineering and computer science training is increasing, but in the 
UK it is on the wane. Efforts to improve this situation are being made by a 
number of bodies, but the skills and expertise available to British industry in 
this field are declining. The key issue is appropriate education to produce 
graduates that are capable of participating effectively in the development of 
large complex software projects (Collins 2004). The skills base necessary to 
develop trustworthy software requires a body of experienced professionals 
that are appropriately certified or chartered. It also requires that employers 
need to recogize that it is imperative that they recruit experienced people to 
work on projects to develop software. To ensure that such people are 
available the overall qualifications of the labour pool must be continuously 
upgraded. Also there must be greater awareness of vulnerabilities among 
those who invest in the components of cyberspace systems. This would create 
stronger incentives to introduce measures aimed at reducing cyberspace 
system vulnerabilities.  
Future research on the dependability of software systems must be cross-
disciplinary. It will need to bring together those who undertake research 
within technical and procedural disciplines that presently concentrate on 
particular types of systems, dependability attributes, types of faults and means 
for achieving dependability, with those researchers that tackle socio-technical 
issues including design, usability, functionality specification, acceptable 
levels of failure, recovery modes and incident management, as well as ‘best 
practice’ and innovative approaches to project management and software 
engineering throughout the whole of the life cycle. If the practice of software 
engineering is strengthened by measures that enhance the dependability or 
trustworthiness of software systems the opportunities for criminal attack or 
accidental failures could be minimized. 
  
The UK could gain a competitive advantage if it provides leadership in 
standards setting with respect to the testing and certification of all aspects of 
dependable systems, including autonomous software agents (see Ch. 6). If 
processes and systems created in the UK are accredited, and this accreditation 
is seen elsewhere as having value, practices, procedures and technical 
designs, especially with respect to networks and software, could spread 
rapidly producing externalities and a strong potential for global impact. 
However, for this to happen cyberspace systems developers and users would 
need to see a reasonable financial return, given the additional costs of more 
dependable systems. This suggests the need for cross-disciplinary research on 
the economic incentives that will arise in future markets and the links between 
these incentives, people’s perceptions of risk and their willingness to trust 
networks despite their relatively low levels of dependability (economic 
incentives and markets are considered below). 
2.7.2 Managing Identity(ies) in Cyberspace 
One of the most significant issues for crime prevention is the fact that in 
cyberspace users may choose to maintain their anonymity. In addition, new 
issues will be raised in areas where identification of users is essential for 
commercial services, or for access, for instance, to health records and income 
tax returns or for crime prevention, for example, the appropriate means of 
authentication of identity. In Parts 2 and 3 of this volume we have included 
reviews of the many instances in which people, devices or digital data need to 
be identified and authenticated (see Chs 4 and 10). Users (including 
computers, software agents and people) can be authenticated using something 
they own, something they know or something they are. All these techniques, 
whether used alone or in combination, assume that there has been an initial, 
accurate identification and then rely on that assumption. If the original 
identification is not conducted properly then there is a risk of error in later 
identification. 
Passwords, encryption and biometrics can be used as means of 
identification. The last offers a direct means of authentication but, even in this 
case, there is a risk of error insofar as no two biometric templates match 
perfectly. In using this type of authentication a Type 1 error may occur such 
that the system fails to recognize a valid user or a Type 2 error may occur 
where the system accepts an impostor. The likelihood of such errors has 
implications for the usability of cyberspace systems and for the extent of 
actual and perceived risk. Decisions in this area will influence the perceived 
trustworthiness of the service applications that are supported by the 
cyberspace infrastructure and raise questions about people’s attitudes to 
intrusions into their bodies.26 One means of addressing this area will be to 
examine empirically how people respond to specific measures and how they 
perceive the trade-offs between intrusion and protection, and their respective 
benefits and costs. Use of biometrics will mean that it will not be possible to 
maintain multiple core identities for a given purpose without introducing 
considerable system and process complexity. 
2.7.3 Cyberspace Usability, Risk Management and Security 
Changes in the design of secure technologies and in social practices and 
cultural norms of information assurance influence the effectiveness of 
strategies to reduce crime and the threats arising from changes in information 
handling procedures. Empirical research demonstrates that, despite the 
availability of mechanisms that can be used to authenticate the identity of 
cyberspace users, many of these are hard to use or are rendered ineffective 
because of the demands they make on users. Unless users are given training in 
the use of those mechanisms that are available, human error will make them 
of little benefit (see Chs. 10, and 11). 
The usability of such mechanisms as passwords, tokens and encryption, 
depends on the organizational processes and the workflows that are involved 
as well as on the extent to which users believe themselves to be at risk. 
Studies of organizational and behavioural change demonstrate that effective 
risk management requires the development of a ‘culture of security’ where 
end-users, rather than their physically present or distant managers, take 
responsibility for monitoring risks and acting appropriately. Although 
information security management codes have been developed, the complexity 
of cyberspace systems and the dangers of unwanted intrusion or attack mean 
that there will be an increasing need for the interoperation of management 
policies and new frameworks to ensure that security measures become more 
closely integrated into business processes. In parallel with the need for new 
approaches to software engineering and the design of large complex software 
systems, there is a need to foster ‘persuasive design’ techniques that reward 
cyberspace users for good security practices (see Ch. 10).  
A key lesson from empirical research on security mechanisms and 
behaviours is that appropriate and effective security must be an integral part 
of the socio-technical system. Security needs to be integrated into all 
cyberspace development approaches. A central focus for crime prevention 
strategies may be the point at which human beings directly interface with the 
digital world. Research on cyberspace market evolution also suggests that as 
the cyberspace system evolves, a major area of development concerns the 
technical interfaces and standards that are used. These interfaces and 
standards are the vulnerable points in cyberspace in terms of security and the 
risks associated with them will either be amplified or attenuated in the future.  
  
The vast scale and scope of cyberspace also highlights the need to achieve 
greater reliability in the authentication of information and digital 
documentation, which may be accompanied by metadata describing the 
document’s use and functionality. This raises issues of digital rights 
management, data and information ownership, identity and privacy. As agent 
software is used in an increasingly large number of cyberspace applications, 
the necessity for identification and authentication of software and data 
objects, as well as of people, will grow in importance.  
There will continue to be a need for research into the security of 
technology and on the effectiveness of identification processes used for 
important everyday processes. The questions that must be addressed on an 
ongoing basis are: (i) How much ‘security’ or ‘strength’ is appropriate? (ii) 
What is the appropriate balance between procedural approaches and 
architectural solutions to reduce the risk of vulnerabilities arising as a result 
of human behaviour? (iii) What kinds of education programmes could be 
used to highlight the need for compliance with local security policies?27 
2.7.4 Cyberspace and Crime Prevention Strategies 
Crime occurs in many forms and one way of depicting generic crime 
problems and solutions as a guide for future crime prevention strategies in 
cyberspace is within the Misdeeds and Security framework (see Table 2.3) 
This could be modified as further consideration is given to the risks 
encountered in cyberspace. 
Cyberspace developments of this kind could be addressed in the context of 
crime prevention strategies through the further elaboration of ‘criminal 
opportunity’ models. Felson’s routine activity theory has been used to 
encourage those responsible for crime prevention to consider the physical and 
virtual locations and times in everyday life when potential offenders are likely 
to become motivated by contact with vulnerable crime targets, especially in 
the absence of ‘capable guardians’ (Felson 1987). In an extension of this 
model, efforts are being made to develop crime prevention activities to 
reduce the likelihood of the ‘conjunction of criminal opportunity’ (Ekblom 
2003; Rogerson and Pease 2003). 
The ‘conjunction of criminal opportunity’ model provides a means of 
systematically considering the conditions necessary for a crime to occur and 
the possibilities for prevention. It focuses both on the predispositions of 
potential offenders and on the immediate characteristics of the crime situation 
– in this case the online and offline situation of cyberspace users and the 
systems within which they operate (Ekblom 2002, 2003). With respect to the 
situation, the model signposts many factors that encourage crime. Crime 
prevention can be defined as an intervention that tackles the causes of 
criminal events to reduce the risk of their occurrence and/or the potential 
seriousness of their consequences. The causes of crime can be complex, but 
also remote and fairly weak. However, immediate causes are reducible to 11 
generic precursors which act through common aspects of crime situations and 
of criminals – whether in the physical world or in cyberspace. 
 
Table 2.3 Cyberspace developments and risk and security measures 
 
Misdeeds (Ms) Actions Supporting Security (Ss) 
Misappropriated (theft) Secured against theft 
Mistreated (damaged or injured) Safeguarded against damage 
Misused (for crime, including counter 
measures against prevention or 
enforcement) 
Shielded against misuse 
Mishandled (fraud, counterfeiting, 
smuggling, illegal divulgence) 
Supporting – justice, crime reduction, 
community safety (facilitating arrest, 
forensics, identification, punishment, 
reassurance) 
Misbehaved (disorder and antisocial 
behaviour) 
Scam-proofed 
Mistaken (false alarms, wrongful 
accusation, leading to miscarriage) 
‘Sivilized’ –conducive to good behaviour 
Mistrusted (non-reporting of crime to 
authorities) 
Straightening adverse side-effects 
 
Source: Adapted from Ekblom (2004a). 
 
The conjunction of criminal opportunity occurs when a predisposed, 
motivated and equipped offender encounters, seeks or engineers a crime 
situation involving human, material or informational targets, enclosures (such 
as a building or a firewall), a wider environment (such as a shopping centre or 
a financial system) and people (or intelligent software agents), which are 
acting in diverse ways as crime preventers or promoters (see Table 2.4).  
Preventive interventions can act by interrupting, diverting or weakening 
any of these causes. Understanding these resources for offending is important 
because they influence the situation that crime preventers confront and the 
strength of the offender’s predisposition and motivation to commit a crime 
(Ekblom and Tilley 2000). 
 
Table 2.4 Generic precursors of crime 
 
  
Potential Offender Crime Situation 
Presence (incl. virtual) in crime situation 
without leaving traces 
Target of crime (person, company, govt.; material 
goods, systems, information) that is vulnerable, 
attractive or provocative 
Perception of risk, effort, reward and 
conscience and consequent decisions 
Enclosure (safe, building, firewall) that is 
vulnerable, contains targets 
Resources for crime (skills, weapons, 
knowledge, equipment, access to 
supporting network; modus operandi to 
maximize reward and minimize risk and 
effort, creating a crime opportunity. 
Wider environment (town centre, airport, 
computerized financial system) that contains 
targets, generates conflict; favours concealment, 
ambush and escape over surveillance and pursuit 
Readiness to offend (motivation, emotion, 
influenced by current life circumstances) 
Absence of preventers (people or intelligent 
software) that make crimes less likely to happen 
Lack of skills to avoid committing crime 
(literacy, social skills) 
Presence of promoters (people or intelligent 
software) that make crime more likely to happen, 
including careless individuals, reckless 
designers/manufacturers, deliberate fences and 
criminal service providers 
Predisposition to criminality (personality, 
ideology) 
 
 
Source: Ekblom (2004b). 
 
Trust fits into this framework in several ways. An Internet shopper who is 
too trusting may act as a careless or negligent crime promoter, as may a 
system designer. Conversely, being an effective crime preventer means being 
equipped with appropriate applications and systems. Offenders exploit 
misplaced trust, sometimes to an expert degree and are aided by software and 
hardware based resources, for example, ‘skimming’ devices fitted into cash 
machines to clone cards. 
Efforts to improve the security of complex information systems often rely 
on the use of risk analysis to justify the cost of designing and implementing 
security features (Courtney 1977; Fitzgerald 1978). The concept of a criminal 
opportunity can be used to understand the means of reducing crime 
opportunities in organizational contexts where threats to security are posed by 
dishonest staff (see Ch. 11). Clarke’s (1997) ‘Crime Specific Opportunity 
Structure’ model focuses, for example, on the opportunities available to 
potential inside perpetrators of network related crimes (see Ch. 11).  
These approaches could be extended to examine the organizational 
contexts and behavioural characteristics that are most likely to give rise to 
criminal opportunities. Notwithstanding the development of these approaches, 
answers to questions about acceptable levels of dependability and trade-offs 
require an understanding of the nature of trusting behaviour among human 
and software agents and of the actual and perceived risk associated with 
cyberspace. 
A key area is this context is ICT Forensics. Data held on hard disks can be 
put to criminal use. If they can be identified and authenticated, these data can 
provide evidence of malfeasance. The problem of identifying ‘the original’ is 
difficult and frequently overlooked. In the future, as the scale of cyberspace 
systems increases, the sheer volume of distributed stored data may overwhelm 
the capacity of the law enforcement agencies. As data management tools are 
developed, they are not likely to have the processes of auditability and 
traceability incorporated in them required for evidence gathering. It will be 
necessary, therefore, to document these requirements, which, in turn, will 
require stakeholder collaboration to reach agreement on the principles and 
standards to be met. 
As data are increasingly likely to be stored in jurisdictions beyond the 
reach of national law enforcement agencies some form of international code 
of practice will be needed to enable access to data by the agencies involved in 
crime detection and criminal prosecutions. If the match between these data 
and a suspect with seemingly appropriate spatial and temporal proof is 
insufficiently strong, the data will not stand up in court as evidence. One 
objective in using forensic data could be to establish sufficient strength of 
‘binding’ or linkage to allow other physical investigations to be instigated that 
would add to this evidence. This would require collaboration between system 
designers and legal and law enforcement specialists.  
The availability of mobile and transportable miniature mass storage 
devices that use strong encryption will expand enormously over the next 
decade. Reliance on the analysis of log files to identify when and where 
specific devices have accessed or are accessing systems and networks and 
being able to very rapidly and accurately trace subsequent use seems the only 
means at present for tracing illegal activities. As the volume of encrypted 
material within which the criminal can conceal his or her activities increases, 
it is possible that, where data are shown to be encrypted and not legitimate, 
they could be used to justify further investigations. The question of whether 
the public or private sector would be willing to bear the costs of very 
expensive tracking or endure rapidly spreading unprosecutable crime is an 
urgent subject for debate.  
Forensic tools are being developed by a very small number of academic 
groups and companies to meet specific needs. Without some collaboration 
with their developers, the ability of investigators and computer forensic 
experts to maintain parity with the environment within which the data under 
investigation are used and stored, will be limited. The ability to carry out 
forensic investigations will need to be seen as a legitimate requirement placed 
on a system or application design if this situation is not to become worse. All 
  
of these issues need discussion, but it is unclear who should initiate it. There 
is some indication that cyberspace users do not ‘want to know’ in advance of 
any potential weaknesses. Nevertheless, there is a need to consider what 
balance between evidential – investigative – preventative computer forensics 
could be struck and the risks and benefits of the various options.  
At present there has been little fundamental research into the issues of the 
scale of cyberspace and the criminal use of data, especially that stored outside 
the jurisdictions of law enforcement agencies, and the ethical, social, 
economic and legal strategies that might be adopted. There is a need for 
cross-disciplinary research in the area of ICT forensics and cyber-evidence 
management. Enhancement of trustworthiness itself will reduce the likelihood 
of malfeasance by temptation, but without strong cyber-policing, the 
determined criminal will find in the use of ICTs and the applications that will 
be running on the Internet, a ‘honey pot’ of opportunity and illegal gain. 
2.7.5 Trust and Risk in Cyberspace 
We have included reviews of research on risk perception and on trust from 
the perspectives of the social sciences in Part 3 of this volume. There is a 
growing body of literature that provides insight into whether the technical 
possibility of risk in cyberspace is the same as the perception and actual 
experience of risk. We can gain insight into perceptions of risk in cyberspace 
by drawing upon research into the way members of the public have been 
found to appraise uncertainty and the risks associated with scientific and 
technological innovations (see Chs 7 and 8). It seems clear that the social 
meaning of a risk will influence its salience and the way uncertainty is judged. 
People’s perceptions of risk are related to their cultural and social values, 
their attitudes to blame, their morality and how they view an event such as an 
intrusion that reveals their identity in cyberspace. In addition, the attitude of 
the public towards experts and regulators can be expected to influence the 
way cyberspace risks are interpreted. Risk perception is also intimately linked 
to levels of trust.  
These observations rely on theories and empirical research in the fields of 
cognitive psychology, psychometric analysis and studies of risk and emotion. 
There is also evidence from studies in the field of media and communications 
that people’s perceptions of risk are strongly influenced by the symbols 
within their social networks and in the media’s reporting of events. There is 
empirical evidence based on people’s stories about their perceptions of risk 
that suggests that whereas experts see risks as chains of cause and event, lay 
people tend to see them in a social context of relationships. Research is 
needed to assess the importance of these observations for cyberspace and 
crime prevention. This body of research helps to explain why probabilistic 
analyses of actual risk may vary considerably from analyses that take the 
context of cyberspace experience into account in a qualitative way. 
It is also important to distinguish between reported perceptions of trust and 
the way in which people actually conduct their lives. We have little evidence 
of the extent of inconsistency between reports of mistrust in individuals or 
institutions and the capacity to place trust in various parts of the socio-
technical system (O’Neill 2002).  
The literature on risk perception suggests that perceived risk may be 
amplified or attenuated depending on a large number of socio-technical 
factors. The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) has been 
developed as a means of integrating disparate approaches to risk (Kasperson 
et al. 2003; and see Ch. 8). The SARF: 
… aims to examine broadly, and in social and historical context, how risk and risk 
events interact with psychology, social, institutional, and cultural processes in 
ways that amplify and attenuate risk perceptions and concerns, and thereby shape 
risk behavior, influence institutional processes, and affect risk consequences 
(Pidgeon et al. 2003, p. 2). 
Debate among adherents to different positions with regard to the risk 
people will encounter or perceive in cyberspace are informed by very 
different knowledge claims (Callon 2003; Rosa 2003). The SARF could be 
further developed to understand why some risks associated with cyberspace 
attract particular social and political attention (risk amplification), even when 
experts judge them to be relatively unimportant. Application of the SARF 
could produce a new frame in which to evaluate the likely effectiveness of 
crime prevention strategies.  
We know that trust is a means for alleviating risks, but there is little 
empirical research on the conditions under which people are prepared to trust 
others in cyberspace or to trust in the trustworthiness of cyberspace systems. 
Yet, with the spread of access to global networks, it is clear that in many 
circumstances people are willing to trust in each other in cyberspace and in 
the notion that system-to-system interdependencies and relationships are 
trustworthy. Empirical research in the fields of human-computer interaction 
and computer-mediated communication is beginning to provide insight into 
person-to-person and person-to-system trust in cyberspace. Key variables 
influencing trust include: the number of actors involved, the types of actors, 
whether relationships are conducted synchronously or asynchronously, the 
availability of trust-warranting properties and signals to convey those 
properties, prior experience and the propensity to trust, and the perceived 
benefits and risks of trusting behaviour.  
It seems that as more information exchanges are mediated by technology, 
the responsibility for supporting trust will increasingly fall on cyberspace 
  
system designers and operators. Studies of trusting behaviour in these areas 
also provide suggestions for the types of factors that are likely to influence 
agent-based behaviour in contexts where system-to-system trust must be 
established. However, most of the research in this area is conducted using 
stylized game-theoretic models, which limit the number of variables that can 
be examined in a given ‘game’, as discussed below, and are difficult to 
populate with data reflecting the experiences of cyberspace users. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the propensity to trust another person or 
software agent is partly informed by expectations (see Chs 12 and 13). 
Agents’ expectations also can be modelled probabilistically to provide insight 
into the likelihood that choices about whether or not to trust will yield various 
outcomes. Such game-theoretic approaches assume that an agent’s decision to 
play in a game involves trust that actor(s) will behave as expected. The 
outcomes of the games are influenced by the completeness of the institutional 
framework (laws, rules and standards), by the completeness of the 
information available to the agents in the game and the network structure of 
the game that is established at the outset.  
One application of this approach is a coordination game in which it is 
feasible to establish whether high or low trust equilibria will emerge if all the 
agents interact in a fully connected network according to a pre-specified set 
of rules, and definitions of trustworthiness. One of the assumptions in this 
approach is that the players engaged in a game will act rationally and this 
allows their behaviour to be predicted. This approach facilitates 
understanding of the consequences of precautions that may be taken to avoid 
crime in the face of externalities. Research in this area helps to demonstrate 
when such measures are likely to affect the risk to others and when it is 
appropriate to transfer the cost of protection to others, that is, from the 
cyberspace system developer to the end-user firm or the consumer. This work 
suggests that it is the distribution rather than the level of trust that supports 
the setting of priorities for establishing trust relationships and establishes a 
structure for negotiating the distribution of liabilities arising from cyberspace 
interactions.  
In recent years there has been a revival of the concept of social capital in 
which trust is a major component. This concept can be applied to examine the 
positive effects expected from networks of trusted agents. Drawn from studies 
in sociology, human geography and economics, it has been suggested that 
societies with a more complex and dense pattern of networked social relations 
may benefit from lower transaction costs and stronger assumptions about 
whether agents will act opportunistically. This approach could be extended in 
the future to examinations of the way webs or networks of trust emerge in 
virtual communities of various kinds. There is a need to better understand 
how social capital can be fostered in cyberspace (see Ch. 13). 
Just as there is uncertainty about how best to design and operate 
trustworthy or dependable cyberspace systems, the trusting behaviour and 
trustworthiness of human and software agents is not clearly understood. In the 
light of this uncertainty, it is important to consider cyber trust and crime 
prevention issues in terms of the ethical issues, especially with respect to 
identity, anonymity and privacy. In cases where the evidence-base is weak, 
we also need to rely on principles derived from plausible theories. We have 
seen that cyberspace security systems often require identity authentication, 
but the Internet is currently designed to facilitate the way people can ‘play’ 
with their identity. This will remain the case, as long as the design and 
architecture of the Internet provides for anonymous communications.28  
Views are divided about the ethical justification for interventions in 
cyberspace that seek to limit this potential. From an ethical standpoint, this 
suggests the need for a forum in which those who remain sceptical of the need 
for security interventions to prevent crime indicate their requirement for 
justification of changes that might limit the scope for anonymity (see Ch. 14). 
However, the reviews in Chapters 8 and 14 demonstrate why it is so difficult 
to discuss these key issues in generic open forums. The principal difficulties 
are the extent to which different meanings become attached to the perceptions 
of risk and danger, uncertainty about how the media are likely to influence 
opinion in this area, and the strongly polarized views about the origins and 
appropriate future of the Internet.  
With respect to the polarized views about the Internet, while some seek to 
place the burden of proof on those that wish to alter the libertarian and open 
principles that underpin the Internet as we know it today, others argue that, 
although recognizing that certain privileged activities such as science or 
commerce must be able to continue in a secure way, liberty and openness are 
important values. The judgements, however, might be made by those with 
political power, in which case the trade-offs between individual privacy and 
the benefits of greater collective security would need to be taken account of 
in such a way that specific issues would be considered and assessed as 
transparently as possible. 
From a moral standpoint, some regard trust as the effect of good behaviour 
while others regard it as being the cause of good behaviour. Some argue that 
liberty and openness are essential and non-negotiable in cyberspace; others 
want to alter the design of cyberspace to make inappropriate behaviour more 
difficult. Different views about the moral arguments supporting different 
approaches to crime prevention strategies for cyberspace hinge on the extent 
to which actors are presumed to be rational and are likely to act to maximize 
their own self-interest. In an environment where there are multiple complete 
or partial identities, standard assumptions about what motivates actors need, 
at the very least, to be carefully scrutinized. 
  
Having originated in the west, the Internet has a western bias, which tends 
to inform debate and policies for crime prevention. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that actors should be allowed to pursue their conception of what is 
‘good’ (if this does not interfere with others). On the other hand, it can be 
argued that there should be no departure from western principles and their 
implications for crime or cyber-terrorism. It is also possible, however, to 
argue that the key issue is the privileges that people should have in 
cyberspace, thus enabling debate about this to become a political problem 
that may be addressed through compromise and various social policy 
measures.  
Positions on this issue are closely linked to the role of the media and 
strategies for building awareness of the risks in cyberspace, and about trust 
and the trustworthiness of cyberspace. As with other issues where there is 
uncertainty and a possibility of the amplification of risk, if there is to be 
informed and reasoned debate about these issues, citizens must be well 
informed about cyber trust and crime prevention issues.  
The government, the private sector, citizens and civil society groups – as 
well as the traditional and alternative media outlets – will continue to draw 
attention to many of the problems and issues in this area.29 The debates that 
ensue will not all be based on reasoned argument and the provenance of some 
of the information upon which these debates rely may be difficult or 
impossible to trace. However, as awareness of cyberspace risk and 
vulnerability continues to spread, there are growing numbers of forums 
(national and international) that are seeking to foster critical and reasoned 
debate and to adopt measures to tackle specific issues. This highlights the 
importance of ongoing monitoring by governments and other actors of 
opportunities to facilitate such debates such that consideration is given to the 
feasibility and appropriateness of actions proposed to limit crime.  
Existing theory and empirical evidence do not support unambiguous 
conclusions in this area. This is to be expected given the emergent properties 
of a complex system. Similarly, there are a substantial number of models and 
perspectives on trust and trustworthiness in cyberspace, but these enable 
relatively few inferences to be drawn about trust and trustworthiness. One of 
the difficulties of translating the results of existing research into practical 
solutions for crime prevention is that many conceptual frameworks and 
models are based on strict parameters and assumptions and some approaches 
do not lend themselves to empirical verification.  
Those that can be analyzed empirically often yield results that are open to 
different interpretations depending on views about how opinions are 
influenced by the media and other psychological and sociological factors. In 
addition, even though the use of computers and the Internet has reached a 
reasonably high level in the UK, the more advanced components of 
cyberspace systems have yet to diffuse widely. Globally, too, usage is very 
uneven and interactions are globally dispersed in many cases adding to the 
difficulties involved in understanding trust and risk perception. This too is an 
area that represents a major gap in the evidence base necessary to support 
more effective crime prevention strategies. 
2.7.6 New Cyberspace Technologies and Trust 
We have examined how various models of trust are being applied in two 
important areas of technical development – knowledge technologies and the 
semantic web and software agent-based systems (see Chs 5 and 6). 
If cyberspace systems are to become more dependable and secure there 
will need to be changes in the design and implementation of the ICT 
components. Agent-based computing is regarded as a means of achieving this. 
Software agents have to trust each other in order to minimize the uncertainty 
associated with their interactions and take account of individual and system-
level trust. In both cases, there is a need for protocols that ensure that the 
software and human agents will find no better option than telling the truth and 
interacting honestly with each other. This is a major challenge for the future.  
In addition, work on knowledge technologies and on the semantic web 
requires a certain degree of trust in the means of ensuring that the input to 
knowledge and information manipulation processes are trustworthy. The 
available tactics for imbuing trust include transparency, ownership rules, the 
means to extend trust between sub-networks, certification, restriction of entry, 
formal methods, calculations, interrogation and knowledge management. 
Research in this area shows that each of these tactics has costs and benefits 
and that they must be combined with effective trust management strategies for 
the software systems – including the use of metadata and ontologies for trust 
requirements. Use of all of these tactics raises questions with respect to 
identity, anonymity and privacy. 
Effective procedures for the maintenance of knowledge bases will need to 
be developed to ensure that, as sharing of knowledge in a controlled way 
becomes a major influence on commercial and social behaviour, the sources 
used are maintained and exploited in ways that ensure they can be trusted. At 
present there is very little understanding of the end-user’s perspective on 
these issues.  
A problem related to research aimed at examining end-user perceptions of 
trust and the trustworthiness of cyberspace is that it is difficult to define trust 
in a way that is meaningful for survey respondents. When trust is defined as a 
‘confident expectation’, survey results for the UK suggest that the 
relationship between information about the Internet, uncertainty and trust 
varies along many dimensions, including the extent of experience in using 
  
online forms of communication (see Ch. 7). Trust appears to be enhanced as a 
person learns more about the technology, but that experience over time may 
also create new uncertainties and perceptions of risk. Individuals with more 
formal education tend to be somewhat more sceptical of the information and 
people accessible via the Internet, but also somewhat less concerned about 
the risks of Internet use. Evidence and analysis are needed to gain a better 
understanding of the underlying social dynamics and learning processes that 
are involved.  
The problems associated with the ‘digital divide’ are likely to persist even 
when people have obtained access to cyberspace. Evidence from the Oxford 
Internet Survey in 2003 suggests that there is lower trust of the Internet 
among categories of users such as the less affluent or the disabled (see Ch. 7). 
For these groups, experience in using the Internet has a particularly 
disproportionate positive impact, increasing their trust in the Internet and 
lessening their preconceived concerns about risks. Education and exposure to 
the Internet may offer a general strategy for coping with the risks and threats 
to the perceived trustworthiness of this technology. However, education and 
exposure to the Internet are skewed towards higher socio-economic groups. 
As a result, these strategies could actually reinforce the ‘digital divide’ in 
access to the Internet. Other survey data (MORI 2003) suggest that there is 
considerable public ignorance about what happens to personal data when it is 
used by public agencies. Overall, there is a gap in the evidence base in this 
area partly because of the lack of comparable and systematic data. 
2.7.7 Cyberspace Market Evolution, the Policy Context, and Privacy 
We have included reviews of research on the economic dynamics of the 
evolution of cyberspace technology and service markets (see Ch. 12) and the 
interaction of these features with policy measures and the legislative 
environment (see Ch. 9). A key observation about market dynamics and the 
changing legislative policy context is that the development of cyberspace is a 
global phenomenon. In the future, monitoring global developments will 
continue to be very important. Effective monitoring across a wide range of 
issues is essential for effective national crime prevention strategies. 
The special characteristics of these markets are an important consideration 
in understanding how cyberspace technologies will evolve and whether there 
will be incentives to invest in more dependable and secure systems. Industrial 
SCP analysis has been used to address this issue. The analysis in Chapter 12 
shows how asymmetrical information between firms and their customers can 
produce customer lock-in, often leading to the emergence of dominant firms. 
Firms will use trust in a variety of ways, sometimes to achieve a form of lock-
in to the market, which is in a ‘low trust equilibrium’ in which there are few 
incentives to invest in more dependable systems.  
In cases where there are few suppliers competing in the market, a small 
number of supplier firms can influence the rate of investment in new 
technologies through their influence over supply and price. In addition, 
analysis suggests that when firms compete in electronic marketplaces they 
encounter new opportunities for using anonymity in ways that make their 
participation in potentially collusive agreements difficult to detect. At the 
same time, new technologies can be used by firms to monitor customer 
behaviour and allegiance to firms because of the customer-related information 
that is available as a result of new information management systems.  
From the customer’s perspective, the analysis of cyberspace markets 
highlights the way new technologies may increase competition by augmenting 
consumer search capabilities through the use of search engines as 
intermediaries. However, intermediaries may not act solely in the consumer’s 
interest, given the economic incentives that drive their operations. In addition, 
in areas such as financial intermediation and electronic payment systems, 
greater trust may enable such intermediaries to encourage increasing market 
concentration. Cyber trust agents are essential if effective competition in 
electronic markets is to be fostered, but it remains uncertain whether the 
market for certification services will grow rapidly in the future.  
The demand for security solutions will be influenced strongly by the costs 
involved in switching between cyberspace security products on the market. 
Economic analysis suggests that the sustainability of trust relationships in 
cyberspace markets may actually depend on asymmetry among the 
participants. ‘Improvements’ or measures designed to enhance the security of 
cyberspace products leading to greater symmetry in the marketplace, may 
actually undermine trust. This indicates again that it is the distribution of trust 
rather than its level that is central to future economic outcomes and whether 
they foster technologies that reduce or exacerbate cyberspace vulnerabilities. 
The parameters of the European Union’s existing legislative framework, 
which affects decisions about cyber trust and crime prevention, are complex 
and involve numerous interdependencies (RAND Europe 2003a,b). This issue 
is considered in Chapter 9. Given that perceptions about privacy are closely 
related to the acceptance of measures to enhance the security of cyberspace, 
we examined whether the prevailing ‘privacy paradigm’ is consistent with the 
need to assess the requirements for improved crime prevention strategies. 
Privacy protection, in particular, relies on many international instruments, 
national legislation, self-regulatory or voluntary tools, and privacy enhancing 
technologies or PETs. Research in this area suggests that PETs cannot 
provide a ‘magic bullet’ to solve privacy problems or address issues of 
identity authentication. It is much more likely that a mix of instruments will 
have to be applied to protect privacy alongside instruments and technologies 
  
that are consistent with equity considerations and the collective interests of 
society. 
Given the complexity of cyberspace and varying levels of dependability or 
trustworthiness, future developments will create new possibilities for 
opportunistic crime and for privacy intrusions. Although technical solutions 
to provide for communications and transactions with rigorous authentication 
may eventually provide a foundation for a higher level of trust in cyberspace, 
they will also create new threats to privacy. One possibility is to encourage 
the development of relatively fine grained ‘digital principles’ to complement 
the security and privacy guidelines developed by organizations such as the 
OECD (2002; and see Ch. 15). Such self-regulatory arrangements might build 
on developments in autonomous software agent computing, but will raise 
issues of privacy protection and surveillance.  
Surveys in many western countries suggest that people generally have high 
and increasing levels of concern about privacy (Bennett 1992; Bennett and 
Raab 2003; and see Ch. 9). While this could be attributed to reports from 
various pressure groups or to press coverage of data protection issues, the 
important point in the context of cyber trust and crime prevention is that 
discussions about privacy generally presume that balance is the main feature 
of policy responses aimed at protecting individual interests in privacy and 
other rights and responsibilities.  
This view has been criticized by those who believe that insufficient weight 
is given to collective or community interests. In the future it will be necessary 
to examine distributional issues and equity concerns within the conventional 
privacy paradigm. This will mean examining who enjoys what privacy and 
why. This view is another feature of the ‘digital divide’, suggesting that 
insofar as there are inequalities in the distribution of privacy protection, the 
issues need to be treated as a social policy concern.  
Very little is known about the distribution of privacy protection in terms of 
typical socio-economic and demographic categories. Empirical research is 
needed on this issue. The results would enable privacy protection to be 
treated as an element of social policy. It could then be debated, together with 
collective security, in terms of alternatives, such as public or private 
provision, the costs and benefits, rights and entitlements, and the best way to 
secure privacy. This is important given that crime prevention will be used to 
protect citizens from infringements to their privacy, for example, as a result 
of the theft of their identities. Better understanding of the distributional 
characteristics of privacy protection would provide an evidence base for 
considering whether inequalities can be justified and whether public policy 
and its implementation can alter them. 
This raises the issue of how much information about our identities is 
required for crime prevention purposes and what should constitute informed 
consent. Research indicates that some people have low levels of trust in those 
who currently and in the future will manage their personal data in both the 
public and private sectors. Few web sites today meet even existing privacy 
protection standards and it is unclear whether a focus on limiting encryption 
will be at the expense of more effective, yet less intrusive, crime prevention 
interventions. Similar arguments may apply to the use of surveillance, the 
effectiveness of which has not been empirically demonstrated. The overriding 
goal should be to reduce crime to ‘tolerable’ levels without incurring 
unacceptable privacy intrusions, and to consider the potential benefits of 
more equitable means of delivering privacy whatever the level of privacy 
protection that is accepted.  
It has been suggested that the development of a Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA) methodology would provide a basis for assessing the actual 
or potential effects that an activity or policy may have for individual privacy 
(Raab 1995; Stewart 1996; and see Ch. 9). Further development could help to 
answer questions such as whether we should see cyberspace and various 
practices as being safe until proven dangerous, or dangerous until proven 
safe. A system where the role of the ‘precautionary principle’ in privacy 
protection is more explicit could become increasingly important (European 
Commission 2000; European Union Council 1999; and see Ch. 9), especially 
if consideration is given to how and when (and when not) to apply it. 
Measures will be needed to resolve tensions between individual privacy and 
collective security and to assess the adequacy and enforceability of data 
protection and freedom of information legislation. Resolution of ethical issues 
in the contexts where privacy issues come to the fore will play a key role in 
determining the acceptability of crime prevention measures. 
  
2.7.8 Lessons for the Future 
The scientific evidence yields insights into the way technical innovation is 
intersecting with human capacities for learning about cyberspace 
developments. In each of the areas we address in this book there are 
uncertainties about the trade-offs that will accompany future human and 
technical measures to develop more dependable and secure cyberspace 
systems to minimize the risk of new ‘conjunctions of criminal opportunity’. 
Some of these trade-offs are summarized in Table 2.5. 
The literature on risk and trust formation and their relationships to the 
design and implementation of cyberspace systems emphasizes the importance 
of values, reciprocity, information management and human and technical 
capabilities. 
 
Table 2.5 Cyberspace and the potential tradeoff 
 
Software dependability User requirements,  
cost and complexity 
Identification Anonymity  
Authentication of software, data objects and people Privacy protection 
Type 1 false rejection errors Type 2 false acceptance errors 
Cyberspace security Cyberspace usability 
Risk Trust and trustworthiness 
Libertarian, open networks Network Control, Surveillance 
Informed debate Risk amplification 
Individual privacy Collective interest 
Liability Risk and cost 
Security Economic growth and innovation  
 
Available research is inconclusive with respect to the implications of 
interventions in cyberspace by those that seek to minimize crime. Given the 
relatively weak scientific evidence in key areas, there is a need to consider the 
ethical positions associated with crime prevention measures and to draw 
inferences about their impact. In some of the areas addressed in this book, the 
lack of systematic and comparable quantitative evidence means the 
foundation for evidence-based decision-making will be weak. In these areas, 
it will be important to consider the ethical positions and to reach judgements. 
Critical reasoning can be applied to reach such assessments – subject to 
review as new evidence accumulates – about ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ 
levels of trustworthiness in relation to the cyberspace system. This is essential 
for evaluations of the distributional issues associated with intrusive privacy 
protection measures and of the benefits of crime protection.  
It is clear that: 
 
• improved crime prevention in cyberspace depends upon a better 
understanding of human motivations and practices and the way these 
are embedded within complex cyberspace systems; 
• problems facing crime preventers will not be solved by better 
technology alone; enforcement of behavioural change consistent with 
‘good’ behaviour in cyberspace will mean enabling people to do the 
‘right’ thing easily with substantial implications for the usability and 
cost of cyberspace technologies; 
• trust in cyberspace can be fostered in both technical and non-technical 
ways; the options need to be considered in the light of studies of risk 
perception and the actual risk encountered in cyberspace and in the 
wider situation; 
• crime prevention measures for cyberspace will need to receive 
widespread consent nationally and internationally if they are to be 
effective; and 
• the dependability of future cyberspace systems and the extent to which 
they ensure human safety and well-being are matters of human choice; 
understanding the human and non-human relationships often requires 
an assumption that it is feasible to believe that agents, both human and 
technological, will act or, in the case of the latter, will have been 
designed and implemented to act, in rational or at last quasi-rational 
ways. 
 
The scale of the challenge facing government policy makers is vast. The 
speed at which the machinery of government operates can be slow relative to 
the potential rate of technological change, and further slowing of the decision 
making process due to the need to adopt international solutions may become a 
larger problem. There are also concerns about introducing legislative and 
governance solutions, which may manage risks more effectively, but stifle 
innovation and competitiveness. When new measures are introduced, they 
interact with other measures often giving rise to unexpected outcomes that 
may be inconsistent with policy – or indeed, with changing social mores. 
No ‘future-proof’ set of measures can be put in place through unilateral 
action because the positions of stakeholders are changing and insufficiently 
clear. Partnerships will be needed between the public and private sectors, 
working with civil society representatives, to create an accepted framework 
for cyber trust and crime prevention. Lessons must be learned from policy 
and regulatory initiatives and the corresponding failures and successes of 
  
these initiatives. There are several research frameworks (new frameworks for 
dependable software engineering, the criminal opportunity models, the social 
amplification of risk framework and the privacy impact assessment 
framework) that could be further developed and interconnected to increase 
understanding of security measures and crime prevention strategies. Crime 
prevention, especially in cyberspace, occurs in a rapidly changing technical, 
economic and social context where unforeseeable properties emerge. The key 
knowledge about what works as a crime prevention strategy is a wasting asset 
that must be constantly replenished if crime preventers are to innovate faster 
than criminals. 
This review and synthesis of the existing scientific evidence in a number of 
key areas has identified some gaps in research that is underway in the UK 
(see Appendix 2A for a summary of these areas). All of these would benefit 
from cross-disciplinary investigation. This work will need to include research 
on the dependability and trustworthiness of all aspects of the cyberspace 
system. There is, in particular, a need to promote cyberspace system design: 
that enables users to manage their privacy and their security and for crimes to 
be prevented or detected; and that encourages greater system reliability and 
robustness, while maintaining a degree of transparency for users. This must 
include ensuring appropriate levels of investment in research and 
development in cyberspace systems, advanced knowledge services, 
management and engineering and in information assurance initiatives. There 
is also a need for a collaborative approach across the research community that 
will harness the considerable breadth of expertise that is available and help to 
overcome existing fragmentation. 
Research needs to be complemented by investment in adequate levels of 
education to build awareness of cyberspace developments and crime 
prevention measures. Many ethical and moral issues are raised by innovations 
in ICTs, which must be debated in the future. Cyberspace must not become 
exclusive to only the ‘experts’, thereby exacerbating ‘digital divides’. 
Building confidence in the information provided by government about the 
risks to those who encounter cyberspace and about the trustworthiness of 
cyberspace systems is essential. The social and economic threats from the 
social fragmentation and exclusion that will arise if some groups take up the 
new technologies and benefit from them, but others do not, must also be 
examined. 
The complexity of cyberspace and its emergent properties means that it 
will be essential to develop methodologies for testing when changes in the 
human and technical system are likely to create new vulnerabilities. Only in 
this way will it be feasible to encourage alternative action. The greatest 
challenge in the future will be managing emergent properties and 
vulnerabilities in ways that respect changing individual and collective values. 
APPENDIX 2.1 POTENTIAL FOR CROSS-DISCIPLINARY 
RESEARCH 
Dependable Pervasive Systems 
• Achieving adequate operational dependability from large complex 
software systems when they are deployed is a critical research 
programme and will remain so for some time – adequate resources are 
needed to support this work. 
• Socio-technical and technical dependability expertise will be required. 
• A key question is at what level does system failure become 
unacceptable and how does the perception of this level differ across 
user groups? 
• Research is needed on the four basic dependability technologies – 
fault prevention, fault removal, fault tolerance and fault forecasting. 
• Research is also needed on the feasibility of developing warrantable 
software and systems that is sufficiently valued by industry to justify 
the cost of deployment. 
• There is a continuing need for a fundamental review of the problems 
in software engineering including formal methods and the creative art 
of software development. 
• Research on software project organization, involvement of end-
users/customers in design and implementation and with a concern for 
the usability of security mechanisms is needed. 
• Research is needed on the appropriate balance between evidential – 
investigative – preventative computer forensics that could be struck 
and on the risks and benefits of options. 
Risk Perception and the Experience of Cyberspace 
• In cognitive psychology, for example, Prospect Theory should be 
applied to investigate the heuristics that influence how people 
experience cyberspace and the likelihood that stereotyping 
perpetrators (especially in the media), contexts and places influences 
risk perceptions and whether such stereotyping has a greater impact 
than expert reassurance.  
• Psychometric research should be applied to determine whether 
intensive users of ICTs have a sense of familiarity and control that 
inoculates them against feeling risk while also leading to a sense of 
complacency about criminal activity – how attentive are people to 
threat-related stimuli in cyberspace? 
• Research is needed on security and risk to develop the ‘criminal 
opportunity model’. 
  
• The SARF approach should be applied to cyberspace and crime 
prevention to provide a means of understanding the communication of 
risk and how it shapes public perceptions.  
• Studies should be made of how learning and risk perception are related 
to ICT system design and implementation.  
• The complexity of individual beliefs, motivations and actions in 
cyberspace requires longitudinal surveys; international comparative 
studies such as the World Internet Project in which the Oxford Internet 
Institute is participating, are needed. 
Security, Trust and Trustworthiness 
• Research is needed on whether trust in cyberspace follows the 
trustworthiness of systems – how do people place trust and refuse to 
trust?  
• Research is needed on modelling that has a greater capacity to take the 
contexts of agent interactions into account. 
• Research is required on the trustworthiness of the information 
acquisition processes in knowledge acquisition and the consequences 
for trusting behaviour.  
• Research is needed on effective procedures for the maintenance of 
knowledge bases. 
• Continuing research is needed on the viability of various biometric 
techniques from market and usability standpoints. 
• Research is needed on the means to establish primary secondary 
verification of ‘the original’ identity and the development of products 
that secure the transmission between the biometric sensor and the 
matching module. 
• Research is needed on perceptions of intrusive measures, such as the 
use of DNA samples and chip insertions in the body, and on the 
physical consequences of implanting chips for life.  
• Analysis of how security, trust and trustworthiness are signalled in 
open global network environments, drawing in part on signalling 
theory from economics as well as on cultural theory, is required.  
• Studies of the impact of ICT legacy applications and system features 
and the potential for lock-in in emerging markets and the mechanisms 
giving rise to market failures in these markets, especially with regard 
to trust services, are needed.  
• Empirical research is needed on the formation of trust via technical 
channels and on how best to encourage usable ICT designs.  
• Research is needed on the semantics of security to develop a better 
understanding of the security discourse is needed to facilitate 
communication and policy development.   
• Research methodologies should be developed for investigating 
organizational risk management using new combinations of problem 
structuring methods and ethnographic methods to provide and evaluate 
risk management decision support in a variety of organizational 
settings.  
• Research is needed to encourage social values and behavioural 
changes to inculcate the valuing by society of the use of shared 
cyberspace, with a focus on attitudes towards rights and 
responsibilities, and to establish the factors that favour acceptance of 
these spaces as safe, secure and reliable. 
• Research is needed on PETs and the appropriate allocation of control 
over cyberspace as between users and system designers and operators. 
• Research is needed on the notion of balancing cost and risk with 
reward by developing a methodology for investigating the effects of 
different (portfolio) management strategies. 
Risk, Precautionary Measures and Innovation 
• Research is needed to establish whether precautionary measures are 
likely to lead to a failure to take advantage of the benefits of new 
technologies. In particular, there is a need to develop the PIA 
methodology. 
• Research is required on the distribution of capabilities for privacy 
protection among different groups within the population. 
• Research is needed on the potential trade-offs between productivity 
gains and levels of ‘acceptable’ risk. 
• Evaluations are needed of whether crime that is linked to cyberspace 
developments is being kept within tolerable limits and whether the 
perceived riskiness of cyberspace is diminishing over time. 
Policies, Principles and Legislation 
• Qualitative and experimental research is needed to examine the 
relevance to cyber trust and crime prevention of past research and the 
effectiveness of actual policies and techniques that are being applied.  
• Research is needed on international developments and distinctive 
approaches to legislation, policy and regulation. 
• Research is required on the epidemiology of cyberspace attacks to 
identify ‘treatment’ or policy intervention points adopting the analogy 
HIV/AIDS insofar as the scale of the problem and development of 
possible strategies for treating individuals and slowing the spread of 
infection were only possible after a thorough understanding of the 
epidemiology of the disease was achieved. 
  
• Research is needed on the implications of software liability 
approaches including the development of new fine grained principles 
and practices. 
Futures Research 
• Future work is needed to consider the potential future impacts of 
today’s applications, together with those of potential future 
applications deriving from today’s science base. 
NOTES 
1 This chapter draws in substantial part on the state-of-the-art science reviews that 
follow. Text from these chapters, in some instances, is incorporated directly within this 
chapter. We are grateful to the authors of subsequent chapters for allowing us to draw 
upon their work in this way. The views incorporated in this synthesis chapter are not 
necessarily those of any institution. We accept full responsibility for the views 
expressed in this chapter and for any errors or omissions.  
2 This synthesis chapter and the science reviews, i.e. Chapters 3 to 12 of this book, were 
peer-reviewed by a minimum of two anonymous referees who were acknowledged 
experts in their respective fields. The authors of this chapter thank all those who 
participated in the review process and acknowledge the comments that were received 
and fed back to the contributors to this volume.  
3 Chapters 13 to 15 were commissioned to address key areas that came to light as a result 
of discussion among participants in the Foresight project and are not intended to 
provide comprehensive reviews in the style of the preceding chapters. 
4 And see Castells (2001); Gibson (1984); and Mitchell (1996).  
5 Social technology is terminology often used in the social sciences, including the social 
studies of technology and sociological literatures. For instance, Foucault (1970) uses 
the term ‘technology’ to refer to technologies of the self and governance structures and 
processes, see also Rose (1999). Others use this terminology to refer to aspects of the 
social system that either become embedded in a technical system by virtue of design 
choices that reflect alternative values or, alternatively, represent the discourses, 
processes and procedures that are used to develop and implement the components of a 
technical system (see Pinch 1992).  
6 Throughout, we use the term cross-disciplinary to encompass those who favour multi-
disciplinary or inter-disciplinary research; what we intend is stronger cooperation based 
upon excellence in research located in many different disciplines. 
7 RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman public key encryption technology). 
8 See also Frith and Blakemore (2003); McClue (2003); Morris et al. (2003); Thiel, 
2001; and O’Hara et al. (2003) for Foresight research on memory and cognition. 
9 For empirical data on high-tech crime in the UK see National Hi-Tech Crime Unit 
(2004), which indicates that from a sample of 105 business employees the following 
computer-related crimes were identified as serious – sabotage of data or networks 91%; 
virus attacks 90%; financial fraud 88%; theft of proprietary information 86%; attacks, 
e.g. Denial of Service 79%; theft of laptops 76%; unauthorized website access/misuse 
75%; spoofing attacks 74%; theft of other hardware 71%; telecommunications fraud 
55%; telecoms eavesdropping 48%; and active wiretapping 43%. 
10 Current advice on the management of computer crime-related evidence is contained in 
the ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) guidelines which can be found at 
http://www.nhtcu.org/ACPO%20Guide%20v3.0.pdf accessed 17 Apr. 04. 
11 The ‘grid’ refers to efforts to build the next generation computing infrastructure 
providing intensive computation and analysis of shared large-scale databases, from 
hundreds of TeraBytes to PetaBytes, across widely distributed scientific communities, 
see http://eu-datagrid.web.cern.Ch/eu-datagrid/ for an example of one project accessed 
17 Apr. 04. 
12 http://www.pwc.com/Extweb/service.nsf/docid/B2ECC9B0E9EFA3D785256C330052
47D3 accessed 6 May 04. 
13 See, e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) and Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003). 
14 Summary of Key Themes and Issues, Foresight Expert Workshops, London, November 
2003. 
15 See, for example, Corritore et al. (2003); Egger (2001); McKnight and Chervany 
(2000); Riegelsberger and Sasse (2001); and Ch. 10). 
16 See also Hawkins et al. (1999); Silverstone (2003). 
17 See, for example, Himanen (2001); Lessig (1999); Miller (2003); and Naughton (1999). 
18 See Figure 2.1 on game-theoretic approaches to trust and von Neuman and 
Morgenstern (1944). 
19 Some earlier research was conducted by Johansen (1988); Rice (1984) and Short et al. 
(1976). 
20 See http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/?rq=oxis accessed 17 Apr. 04, for the full survey 
results. 
21 See, for example, Froomkin (1996); Gotoh (2003); Moreh (1997); OECD (2000) and 
Smith and Keehan (1997). 
22 Incomplete information with respect to bargaining and contracts as compared to the 
assumption of perfect information and market equilibrium, see d’Aspremont and 
Gerard-Varet (1979); Gibbons (1992) and Ch. 12. 
23 See European Commission (1999, 2000, 2002a,b); European Union Council (1999) 
and United Kingdom Government (1988, 1990, 1998, 2000a,b,c, 2003). 
24 The OST Foresight programme examined complex systems within the framework of the 
Foresight Cognitive Systems Project, see Austin et al. (2003) for a review. 
25 OST Foresight was commissioning research reviews in this area in the Spring of 2004. 
There is some research on perceptions of risk with respect to the Y2K issue (Pidgeon et 
al. 2003) and on risk management, particularly in the financial services sector 
(Backhouse et al. 2003; and Ch. 11). 
26 Biometric solutions using iris recognition that do not rely upon the use of a data 
template are being developed. If the method is scalable, and the signs are encouraging, 
this has potential. However, usability studies show that there will be a small percentage 
of the population for whom this will not be feasible (see Ch. 10). 
27 The European Commission has launched a ‘preparatory action’, ‘Towards a programme 
to advance European security through Research and Technology’, IP/04/145, Brussels, 
5 Feb. 04. The programme covers: improving situation awareness; optimising security 
and protection of networked systems; protecting against terrorism; enhancing crisis 
management; and achieving interoperability and integrated systems for information and 
communication. 
28 Since the Internet and its platforms are subject to continuous evolution, it is important 
to distinguish analytically here between the public and private spaces that can be 
created, the changes in the Internet Protocol with respect to quality of service and other 
features, and the differences in the requirements for security of various industry sectors, 
government services, and public spaces frequented by citizens and civil society groups. 
29 There are growing numbers of articles in the press focusing, for instance, on the impact 
of anti-spam laws in the US, use of software for anti-terrorism surveillance and the 
privacy and freedom of speech issues that are raised. The subjects for future research 
suggested raised by this volume indicate that information control and assurance, 
together with the overall stability of the cyberspace system will continue to provide a 
focus for, and give rise to, debate. 
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